stating only that it would treat the terms as synonymous "because eligibility to run for office is closely linked to the ability to vote within a particular jurisdiction"
How later courts described this case
- stating only that it would treat the terms as synonymous "because eligibility to run for office is closely linked to the ability to vote within a particular jurisdiction"
- “ ‘[W]here a person leaves his residence and goes to another place, even if it be another [s]tate, with an intention to return to his former abode, or with only a conditional intention of acquiring a new residence, he does not lose his former residence so long as his intention remains conditional. ’ ” (quoting Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners, 370 Ill. 196, 201 (1938))
- "`[W]here a person leaves his residence and goes to another place, even if it be another [s]tate, with an intention to return to his former abode, or with only a conditional intention of acquiring a new residence, he does not lose his former residence so long as his intention remains conditional.'"
- the question was whether defendant had filed a false statement of candidacy, and it turned on the definition of residence in the Election Code for the purposes of voter registration
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The defendant was properly charged with perjury. See Fagiano v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 98 Ill. 2d 277 , 456 N.E.2d 27 (1983). The jury heard the evidence, was properly instructed as to the law, and found the defendant guilty.
The record shows the defendant used residence as a convenience to his best interest, be it Champaign County or Moultrie County. To adopt the majority’s position that the charge of perjury is not proper “when one simply chooses one location over another as his residence” ( 355 Ill. App. 3d 850 ) eliminates any importance to the sworn statement of candidacy executed by the defendant.
The trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.