finding no reasonable probability that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of voir dire questioning “which occurred long before the jury ever heard any evidence or determined whether defendant was eligible for the death penalty,” thereby rendering the defendant unable to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test
How later courts described this case
- finding no reasonable probability that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of voir dire questioning “which occurred long before the jury ever heard any evidence or determined whether defendant was eligible for the death penalty,” thereby rendering the defendant unable to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test
- noting that the prejudice prong is “not simply an ‘outcome-determinative’ test but, rather, may be satisfied if defendant can show that counsel’s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair”
- appellate counsel is not obligated to raise every conceivable issue on appeal
- "Our rules provide that an appellant's brief must contain `[a]rgument, which shall contain contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities * * *' and `[p]oints not argued are waived'"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
The proceedings which culminated in Jackson’s sentence of death were fatally flawed because they did not comport with the new rules enacted by our court governing the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 631-36 (2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now coming before us. Because Jackson was tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his convictions and death sentence should be vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
Even if Jackson were not entitled to the benefit of the new rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Absent the new rules, there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum, Jackson’s sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9 — l(j) (West 1994). Because he was convicted of murdering more than one victim, the term of imprisonment must be natural life. 730 ILCS 5/5_8 — l(a)(l)(c)(ii) (West 1994).
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting:
For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 636-40 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536, 581-85 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe this cause should be remanded for a new trial conducted in compliance with the new rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my dissents, the procedures in capital cases prior to this court’s adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not sufficiently protect a defendant’s constitutional rights. For this reason, I believe that the new rules should be applied retroactively. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.