The opinion
Shepherd, J.
(dissenting): I think that his Honor very properly refused to allow the award to be impeached in such a summary and informal manner. The compensation of arbitrators may be submitted to them, as well as the other matters in dispute, and their award, in this respect, is equally binding, and must be impeached in the same way.
The award in this case does not, upon its face, disclose the specific items of costs and charges as. fixed by the arbitrators, and, therefore, the Court could not see that they were so unrea *436 sonable as to warrant relief on the ground of fraud or oppression. In such cases the award must be impeached by an action in the nature of a bill in equity charging fraud, misconduct or other grounds of relief, and when the award is to be made a rule of Court there should be, at least, an affidavit setting forth the grounds upon which its enforcement is resisted. The fact that the arbitrators are interested in fixing their own compensation makes no difference, as it is well settled that an award will not be disturbed where parties have knowingly submitted their differences to persons interested in the matters involved. Pearson v. Barringer, 109 N. C., 398 , and the authorities cited. See, also, Fox v. Hazelton, 10 Pick., 275 .
The ruling of the Court below is well sustained by the case of Blossom v. VanAmringe, 63 N. C., 65 , in which Chief Justice PearsoN says: “It certainly cannot be expected that the Court shall wade through all of the voluminous proceedings, accounts, time devoted to the investigation, etc., in order to determine whether the amount of compensation fixed on is too high, for the reason that the parties have agreed to leave that question to the arbitrators, and they are bound by it, except there be an allegation of unfairness so well sustained as to induce the Court to interfere in order to prevent fraud and oppression by an abuse of power confided to the arbitrators.” See, also, Adam’s Equity, 192. To set aside an award upon a motion without affidavit, or upon a mere exception, is, I think, something new in the practice. As to the fixing of compensation, it reduces the determination of the arbitrators to but little more dignity than an ordinary bill of costs, and I cannot see how this is authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure. His Honor seems to have been of the opinion that the new procedure was.designed simply for the purpose of enforcing existing principles of law and equity, and not to change them in any respect. Such, also, seems to have been the view of this Court from the adoption of The Code to the present time. Parsley v. Nicholson, 65 N. C., *437 207 ; Oates v. Gray, 66 N. C., 442 ; Katzenstein v. Railroad Co., 84 N. C., 688 , and numerous other cases. The impeachment of an award, like the correction of a deed, is governed by certain principles, and is by no means a simple matter of practice.
I can conceive of no greater source of confusion than the idea that the Code of Civil Procedure warrants any departure from well settled principles, and that in some vague and , indefinite way it is to be made a refuge for all of the “hard cases,” at the sacrifice of that certainty and uniformity which constitute the beauty and strength of every enlightened system of jurisprudence
I think that the ruling of the Court below should be affirmed, and that the impeaching matter should at least be supported by affidavit.
Per curiam. Error.