explaining that the primary illegality in Mazuca—the illegal detention—was still underway and was “still illegal” at the later point in time at which the detaining officers discovered the valid arrest warrant
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the primary illegality in Mazuca—the illegal detention—was still underway and was “still illegal” at the later point in time at which the detaining officers discovered the valid arrest warrant
- also argued that the placement of a GPS unit on his car prior to Jones was now an illegal search and tainted the evidence obtained as the result of its use; the court of appeals held that “an officer’s good faith reliance on the law or existing precedent is not recognized as an exception to the Texas exclusionary rule;” finding Article 38.23(b) does not state the exclusionary rule applies to “an officer’s good faith reliance on the law or existing precedent.”
- “[N]ot every but/for product of police illegality will constitute evidence ‘obtained’ from that illegality for either federal or state exclusionary rule purposes; evidence is not subject to suppression, in other words, ‘simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.’”
- “[G]iven such an intervening circumstance, Mazuca dictates that a reviewing court should emphasize the third Brown factor, which asks whether the police purposefully and flagrantly disregarded Appellee’s Fourth Amendment rights.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DISSENTING OPINION
Meyers, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
The majority concludes that the taint of the illegal GPS device used to track Appel-lee’s movements had dissipated by the time Appellee consented to a search of his vehicle. Because the search of Appellee’s vehicle was a direct result of the unconsti- , * tutional tracking, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision.
Even though the majority is hesitant to label it as such, this stop was obviously made on a pretense with the officers hoping to be able to search the car. However, even though there was consent to search, there was never an untainted reason to request such consent in the first place. If you were to consider this as. a random stop, there is nothing in the record that indicates that a search of the car would have been justified. There was nothing suggesting that illegal items would be found in the car, nor did the officers discover any outstanding warrants. Therefore, there existed no reason, independent of the illegal GPS tracking, for the officers to ask for consent to search the car.
What has actually taken place here would be as if the officers had entered a moped in the Tour de France, and then the majority justified the officers’ triumph by saying that their cyclist had not taken performance-enhancing drugs. 1 The cyclist’s clean drug test is not an intervening circumstance that removes the taint of the illegal moped, just as verification of Appel-lee’s speeding does not remove the taint of the illegal GPS tracking. I believe the consent to search Appellee’s vehicle and his subsequent confession about the methamphetamine are tainted by the unconstitutional GPS tracking by the officers. For this reason, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.
. For all you non-cycling enthusiasts, a moped is a bicycle with a gasoline engine and is comparable to what we have here-an automobile with a tracking device.