explaining that the primary illegality in Mazuca—the illegal detention—was still underway and was “still illegal” at the later point in time at which the detaining officers discovered the valid arrest warrant
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the primary illegality in Mazuca—the illegal detention—was still underway and was “still illegal” at the later point in time at which the detaining officers discovered the valid arrest warrant
- also argued that the placement of a GPS unit on his car prior to Jones was now an illegal search and tainted the evidence obtained as the result of its use; the court of appeals held that “an officer’s good faith reliance on the law or existing precedent is not recognized as an exception to the Texas exclusionary rule;” finding Article 38.23(b) does not state the exclusionary rule applies to “an officer’s good faith reliance on the law or existing precedent.”
- “[N]ot every but/for product of police illegality will constitute evidence ‘obtained’ from that illegality for either federal or state exclusionary rule purposes; evidence is not subject to suppression, in other words, ‘simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.’”
- “[G]iven such an intervening circumstance, Mazuca dictates that a reviewing court should emphasize the third Brown factor, which asks whether the police purposefully and flagrantly disregarded Appellee’s Fourth Amendment rights.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Johnson, J.,
concurred in the result.
CONCURRING OPINION
Hervey, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Keasler, Richardson, and Newell, JJ., joined.
I join the opinion of the Court but write to further explain how the suppression of the. evidence in this case will not serve the underlying policy reason for the exclusionary rule and how the focus of the Brown test shifts depending on the facts of each case.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, which is well documented by this Court and the United States Supreme Court. 1 Both courts have also stated that the exclusionary rule should be' uSed only as a last resort when *735 the benefit of deterring police misconduct outweighs the-substantial social costs of suppression. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006); State v. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294, 300 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012). This is because, by suppressing evidence to deter police misconduct, that evidence cannot be used to prove guilt, even when a person is guilty. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 (noting that the exclusionary rule can result in “setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large”).
When determining whether evidence should be suppressed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that not all evidence found is “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Rather, a court must determine if the evidence “has been come at by exploitation of [police misconduct] or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged, of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (internal quotes omitted). There are two ways by which tainf of prior illegal conduct can be attenuated. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 .. First,.if the causal connection between the illegal conduct and the acquisition of the evidence is too remote. Id. Second, -even if there is a causal connection, the evidence should-not be excluded if the “interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” Id. To determine the nature of the casual connection, this Court considers three factors: (1) temporal proximity of the illegal conduct to the obtainment of the evidence, (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purposefulness or flagrancy of the official misconduct. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254 . In this case,,the second Brown factor is the most relevant.
An example of an intervening circumstance that broke the chain of causation between the illegal conduct and acquisition of the evidence can be.found in our decision of Mazuca . In that case, police pulled over the appellant on the. belief that white light was emanating from his tail lights, which was later shown not to be true. Thus, the police had no reasonable suspicion to detain him. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d at 296-97 . However, during the unlawful stop, the officers discovered that the appellant had at least two warrants out for his' arrest. After taking him into custody, one of the officers asked the appellant if he had anything illegal on his person, to which h¿ responded that he did. During a search of the appellant, the officer found ecstasy. Id. at 297 . The appellant argued that the discovery of the narcotics should have been suppressed because the traffic stop was illegal. However, we held that the exclusionary, rule did not apply because the discovery of an arrest warrant after illegally stopping the appellant was an intervening circumstance that rendered the causal connection between the illegal stop and .the seizure of evidence “too remote” to merit suppression. Id. at 308-10 . We also found it relevant that the police did not purposely or flagrantly violate the appellant’s rights. Id. at 310 . Proximity is thé most important factor when there is not an intervening circumstance, but. when, as in this case, One is present, the most important factor is whéther the police’s illegal conduct was purposeful -or flagrant.'
Applying these principles to Appellant’s case, the majority correctly identifies the illegal conduct — using the GÍ& device to .track Appellant — and that collecting the GPS data tainted the traffic stop and subsequent discovery of the drugs. But that does not resolve the'issue before us because we must also decide whether the illegal conduct that tainted the traffic stop is so remote from the discovery of the *736 drugs that the taint has been attenuated and, therefore, the drug evidence should not be suppressed.
I agree with the majority that Appellant’s act of speeding was an intervening circumstance that rendered the preceding illegal conduct of the police “too remote” to warrant suppressing the discovered drug evidence. 2 Maj. Op. at 732-33 (citing Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d at 306-07 ). And I further believe that, the suppression of the evidence in this case would not serve to deter future police misconduct because the police believed they were acting in accordance with the law, which has since bqen settled; therefore, the illegal conduct in this case is probably a rare anomaly that this Court will likely never need to address again. Moreover, there can be no doubt that the seized evidence was probative of Appellant’s guilt, and that suppressing the discovery of the drugs would frustrate justice but not prevent future police misconduct.
. Here, although it was illegal for the police to track Appellant’s whereabouts through a GPS device without a warrant, there is reason to believe that the police did not engage in ■ that illegal conduct flagrantly. See Maj. Op. at 733-34. First, the United States Supreme Court decision requiring a warrant to obtain GPS location information was not handed down until after the investigation in this case was completed. United States v. Jones, -— U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 945 , 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). Second, as the majority notes, the record reveals no suggestion that the officer believed his actions were illegal. See Maj. Op. at 733-34