The opinion
Clark, C. J.,
concurs in the well considered opinion of Allen, J., in all respects, and adds: It is true that formerly, in all the States, the Legislatures were allowed to fix their own compensation. This exception to sound principle was deemed unavoidable by reason of its being the legislative power, and therefore the only authority which could act. It is a part of the history this and all other States that at each session of- the State Legislature, owing to the differences among the members as to the proper rate of compensation a week, and often more, of the session was usually wasted in settling that matter. To avoid this the State Constitution, adopted in 1868, Art. II, sec. 28, provided that: “The-members of the General Assembly should receive as compensation for their services the sum of $4 per day for a session not exceeding 60 days, and should they remain longer in session they shall serve without compensation.” Public opinion deemed it inexpedient, as well as an impropriety, that officials should fix their own pay. For the same reason, a similar change was made in the Constitution of nearly all the other- *469 States, fixing the compensation of members of the Legislature. By reason of the increased cost of living, this compensation has now become inadequate. But to meet this, wherever a constitutional amendment has been made it has increased the rate of compensation, and not restored to the Legislature the former power of fixing the compensation of its own members.
It is true that owing to the difficulty of amending the Constitution of the United States, Congress has been left free to fix its own compensation, but this is generally done to take effect with the next Congress. On a memorable occasion, when Congress raised its own compensation and made it date back to the beginning of the session, the popular indignation at what was styled the “back-salary grab” retired most of those members and senators who voted for it to private life.
The State Constitution of 1868 also provided, Art. Ill, sec. 10, that no officer whose office was established either by the Constitution or created by law “shall be appointed or elected by the General Assembly.” This was to prevent the somewhat similar temptation to elect members of their own body. This provision has been stricken out by a subsequent amendment, with the result that it has become not unusual for that body to choose its own members to positions. Especially is this true in the election of trustees of the University, and to other unsalaried positions, the acceptance of which is not subject to the criticism that those elected receive additional compensation, but because in violation of Art. XIY, sec. 7, which provides: “No person, who shall hold any office or place of trust or profit,” either under the United States or any other State, or under this State, “shall hold or exercise any other office or place of trust or profit under the authority of this State, or be eligible to a seat in either House, of the General. Assembly,” with the exception only of “officers in the militia, justices of the peace, and commissioners of charities, or commissioners for special purposes.”
I concur in the opinion of the Court upon both grounds given, L e., (1) That the charter having specified the compensation of these officials, this is not repealed by the general statute, Laws 1917, ch. 136, subch. 5, sec. 6, which is intended to authorize the board of aldermen to fix the salaries of the mayor and other officials. (2) That it is contrary to sound principles that any official should have the power to fix his own compensation.