holding that factors in jail setting may include consideration of “institutional security,” while rephrasing Graham factors as inclusive of “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.“
How later courts described this case
- holding that factors in jail setting may include consideration of “institutional security,” while rephrasing Graham factors as inclusive of “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.“
- holding in this § 1983 suit brought by a pretrial detainee alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause that, in determining "whether force deliberately used is, constitutionally speaking, 'excessive,' " ... courts must use an objective standard; thus "a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable."
- holding a pretrial detainee must satisfy an objective standard and “must show only that the force purposefully or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Additionally, a court must consider “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
- recognizing that “[r]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking, . . . and that safety and order at these institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face” (citation and internal citation and quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice ALITO, dissenting.
I would dismiss this case as improvidently granted. Before deciding what a pretrial detainee must show in order to prevail on a due process excessive force claim, we should decide whether a pretrial detainee can bring a Fourth Amendment claim based on the use of excessive force by a detention facility employee. We have not yet decided that question. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 , 395, n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). If a pretrial detainee can bring such a claim, we need not and should not rely on substantive due process. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 273, 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994)(plurality opinion); Graham, 490 U.S., at 395 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 . It is settled that the test for an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment is objective, see id., at 397 , 109 S.Ct. 1865so if a pretrial detainee can bring such a claim, it apparently would be indistinguishable from the substantive due process claim that the Court discusses.
I would not decide the due process issue presented in this case until the availability of a Fourth Amendment claim is settled, and I would therefore dismiss this case as improvidently granted.