overruling the holding in Commonwealth v. Lesko, 467 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1983), that the post-sentence plea withdrawal standard applies to plea withdrawal requests where the parties have negotiated a sentence, but the defendant moves to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing; Prendes also relied on that holding in Lesko
How later courts described this case
- overruling the holding in Commonwealth v. Lesko, 467 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1983), that the post-sentence plea withdrawal standard applies to plea withdrawal requests where the parties have negotiated a sentence, but the defendant moves to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing; Prendes also relied on that holding in Lesko
- noting Carrasquillo’s holding that “a bald assertion of innocence” is no longer sufficient grounds to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea, and concluding that -7- J-S68022-18 Hvizda’s innocence assertion was “implausible” because it was unsupported by his evidence and rebutted by the Commonwealth’s offer of proof.
- asserting that "the Majority's opinion is so amorphous in its statement of the law that it can be read to say that a trial court, having the opportunity to observe the defendant, can, in its discretion, convert any reason for withdrawal into a 'bare assertion of innocence' and deny the motion"
- holding that defendant’s bare assertion of innocence was insufficient reason to require granting of defendant’s presentence request to withdraw his plea
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION
Justice STEVENS.
I join the majority.
Similar to the companion case of Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 631 Pa. 692 , 115 A.3d 1284 (2015), I write separately to emphasize my disapproval with the Superior Court’s bright-line rule that prohibited, as a matter of law, trial courts from assessing the credibility of an “assertion of innocence” made in the context of a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. This per se approach, which was based upon the utterance of “magic words,” undermined the trial court’s role as a finder of fact and removed necessary discretion from the court. I agree with the majority that such an approach was unsatisfactory. Trial courts must be permitted to evaluate the credibility of an accused’s assertion of innocence, including the evidence of guilt, of delay, and of ulterior or illicit motive in *10 ruling upon an accused’s presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.