holding that discovery order was appealable since the appealing party asserted that order required it to reveal documents purportedly protected under the peer-review and attorney-client privileges and ruling that if “a party is ordered to produce materials purportedly subject to a privilege, we have jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 313[.]”
How later courts described this case
- holding that discovery order was appealable since the appealing party asserted that order required it to reveal documents purportedly protected under the peer-review and attorney-client privileges and ruling that if “a party is ordered to produce materials purportedly subject to a privilege, we have jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 313[.]”
- holding that discovery order was appealable since the appellant asserted that order required it to reveal documents purportedly protected under the peer-review and attorney-client privileges- and stating that if “a party is ordered to produce materials .purportedly subject to a privilege, we have jurisdiction under Pa.R,A.P. 313”
- finding that since board meeting may have been called to seek legal advice - 15 - J-A18011-19 from the lawyers present, it was improper to reject outright the privilege without examination of the factual basis for application of the privilege
- stating that peer review procedures for evaluation can be performed by outside entities at the behest of the professional health care provider
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*1030 CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
STRASSBURGER, J.:
For the reasons provided by the Majority, I too would affirm the March 11, 2014 order. I therefore join Part II of the Majority Opinion. However, unlike the Majority, I also would affirm the June 26, 2014 order. Thus, I dissent to Part III of the Majority Opinion.
As to the June 26, 2014 order, I agree with the trial court’s assessment of UPMC’s attorney-client-privilege argument. UPMC did not claim that Ms. Con-cordia is a lawyer, and nothing in the record would permit a finding that her presentation to the Board was a discussion with legal counsel. For these reasons, I conclude that the trial court properly determined that the attorney-client privilege does not protect the information the plaintiffs sought in requests 23 and 24.
I further note that the trial court refused to address UPMC’s claim that the information in-question was protected by the peer review privilege, essentially because UPMC failed to present the court with a developed argument in support of that claim. Because I agree with the court, I believe the peer review privilege is not grounds for relief concerning the June 26th order.
For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s orders.