The opinion
EeviN, J.,
dissenting in part: I dissent from the decision of the majority in so far as it reverses the judgment rendered in favor of Glenn A. Wilson. In my opinion, the ruling that this particular plaintiff was eontributorily negligent as a matter of law runs counter to a well established principle of the law of negligence that a person is not bound to anticipate negligent acts or omissions on the part of others; but in the absence of anything ivhich gives or should give notice to the contrary, he is entitled to assume and to act upon the assumption that every other person will perform his duty and obey the law and that he will not be exposed to danger which can come to him only from the violation of duty or law by such other person. Gaskins v. Kelly, 228 N.C. 697 , 47 S.E. 2d 34 ; Cummins v. Fruit Co., 225 N.C. 625 , 36 S.E. 2d 11 ; Hobbs v. Coach Co., 225 N.C. 323 , 34 S.E. 2d 211 ; Cab Co. v. Sanders, 223 N.C. 626 , 27 S.E. 2d 631 ; Tarrant v. Bottling Co., 221 N.C. 390 , 20 S.E. 2d 565 ; *560 Murray v. R. R., 218 N.C. 392 , 11 S.E. 2d 326 ; Hancock v. Wilson, 211 N.C. 129 , 189 S.E. 631 ; Jones v. Bagwell, 207 N.C. 378 , 177 S.E. 170 ; Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N.C. 51 , 158 S.E. 840 ; Wilkinson v. R. R., 174 N.C. 761 , 94 S.E. 521 ; Wyatt v. R. R., 156 N.C. 307 , 72 S.E. 383 .
Tbe plaintiff undertook to drive bis automobile on tbe public highway during tbe nighttime. In so doing be bad tbe right to take it for granted in tbe absence of circumstances indicating tbe contrary that no other motorist would permit a motor vehicle either to move or to stand on tbe highway without displaying thereon a lamp projecting a red light visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of five hundred feet to its rear. G.S. 20-129 (d) ; G.S. 20-134. Moreover, he had the further right to presume until given reasonable grounds for thinking otherwise that the driver of any truck becoming disabled on the highway after sundown would display red flares or lanterns at least two hundred feet to the rear of the disabled truck as a warning to approaching motorists of the impending peril. G.S. 20-161.
The answers of the jury to the first issue in each of the cases make it plain that the collision would not have happened if the defendants had obeyed the law and performed their duty. When I interpret the testimony in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Glenn A. Wilson, I reach the conclusion that it reasonably warrants the inferences that Glenn A. Wilson governed his lookout and speed at the time and place named in the pleadings by the assumption that all precautions required of others for his protection from injury had been taken; that he was justified in so doing because no circumstances indicated anything to the contrary; and that by reason thereof he acted as a reasonably prudent person would have done under the circumstances as they presented themselves to him. In consequence, I think that the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss his action upon a compulsory nonsuit, and vote to affirm the judgment in his favor. This conclusion finds support in these decisions: Thomas v. Motor Lines, ante, 122, 52 S.E. 2d 377 ; Cummins v. Fruit Co., supra; Leonard v. Transfer Co., 218 N.C. 667 , 12 S.E. 2d 729 ; Clarke v. Martin, 215 N.C. 405 , 2 S.E. 2d 10 ; Cole v. Koonce, 214 N.C. 188 , 198 S.E. 637 ; Williams v. Express Lines, 198 N.C. 193 , 151 S.E. 197 .
Seawell, J., concurs in dissent.