Opinion

Indiana Gas Company, Inc. and Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company v. Indiana Finance Authority and Indiana Gasification, LLC

  • 977 N.E.2d 981
  • 42 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20226
  • 2012 Ind. App. LEXIS 540
  • 2012 WL 5327104
Court
Indiana Court of Appeals
Filed
Oct 30, 2012
Status
Published
Author
Robb
On the bench
Riley, Darden, Robb
Cited by
5 cases
Authority
More cited than 11.5%

The opinion

ROBB, Chief Judge,

concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I concur in all but the final disposition of the well-considered opinion of the majority in this case. The majority reverses the Commission’s regulatory approval of the Contract because the definition of “retail end use customer” in the Contract deviates from the statutory definition. I do not believe reversal of the Commission’s approval of the Contract in its entirety is necessary.

The Commission has the authority to approve a final purchase contract so far as the contract comports with the statutory requirements of the SNG Act. See Ind. Code § 4-4-11.6 -14. As noted by the majority, the Contract at issue does comport with the statute but for the provision which includes transportation customers within the Contract’s definition of retail end use customers. It is this inclusion which renders the Contract definition of “retail end use customers” incompatible with the statutory definition.

As a general proposition, a contract made in violation of a statute is void and unenforceable. Jaehnen v. Booker, 806 N.E.2d 31, 36 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), tram, denied. However, if a contract contains an unauthorized provision that can be eliminated without frustrating the basic purpose of the contract, the remainder of the contract may be enforced. Harbour v. Arelco, Inc., 678 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind.1997) (holding that if remainder of car rental contract had conformed with statutory requirements, the inclusion of a provision for recovery of attorney fees not authorized by statute would not have rendered entire contract invalid because the primary purpose of the contract would not be frustrated by eliminating that provision). Because the transportation customers are an easily identifiable group, I believe we could merely exclude that part of the Contract which includes transportation customers in the definition of retail end use customers without frustrating the primary purpose of the Contract. Accordingly, I would hold, with the exclusion of that part of the Contract definition of retail end use customers which applies to transportation customers, that the Contract was properly approved by the Commission.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.