explaining that, in determining whether to grant or deny a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, this Court must consider four factors: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, in determining whether to grant or deny a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, this Court must consider four factors: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction.”
- recognizing that “[l]egal, factual, and equitable considerations have developed 69 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1411 Doc: 75 Filed: 04/10/2026 Pg: 70 of 88 significantly since the district court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction,” and thus vacating the district court’s denial of injunctive relief and remanding for further proceedings
- explaining in an action challenging the constitutionality of a Michigan statute that the court granted rehearing en banc and “allow[ed] the Michigan Attorney General to intervene on behalf of the State of Michigan.”
- noting the “district court failed to consider that a reduction in health care benefits can cause irreparable harm” and remanding to the district court to “consider whether injunctive relief is proper”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I fully concur in the court’s ruling today, but write separately to afford one point of clarification.
The majority opinion states: “The plain language of this section [meaning subsection (1) of 11 U.S.C. § 903 ] is not limited to bankruptcy proceedings.” True enough. However, § 903(1) does not exist in a vacuum. It is part of, and in fact an exception to, the main point of a longer sentence. The principal purpose of § 903 is to make clear that Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code does not limit or impair State power. In its entirety, § 903 provides:
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of such municipality, including expenditures for such exercise, but—
(1) a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition; and
(2) a judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does not consent to such composition.
II U.S.C. § 903.
Thus, subsection (1) is an exception to the general proposition that Chapter 9 does not limit or impair State power. The exception appears to reflect congressional intent that where Chapter 9 is invoked, it does operate to limit or impair State power in relation to the specific type of State law described in subsection (1). Viewed in context, then, the plain language of § 903(1) may be construed to mean, and today’s opinion should not be read to foreclose the possibility, that § 903(1) repre *434 sents a specific limitation on State power only where Chapter 9 has been invoked.