Shirk v. Vista Unified School District

WERDEGAR, J., Dissenting.

The majority concludes plaintiff failed to present a timely claim to defendant school district and that her suit is accordingly barred, notwithstanding the 2003 revival statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (c)). I disagree and would affirm the Court of Appeal’s unanimous decision to the contrary.

Plaintiff’s obligation under the claim presentation statute (Gov. Code, §911.2, subd. (a)) was to present her claim “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action” (ibid.). Her claim first accrued sometime in 1979, when defendant’s employee last molested her. She did not present a claim then. But her claim accrued again in 2003 under the newly enacted revival statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (c)), read together with the earlier-enacted delayed-discovery statute (id., subd. (a)), when she “discovered] or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse” (ibid.). The applicable statute of limitations, which in this case is the delayed discovery statute, defines accrual for purposes of the claim presentation *215 statute. (See Gov. Code, § 901.) Having redefined accrual in the applicable statute of limitations, the Legislature necessarily redefined accrual, and plaintiff’s obligations, under the claim presentation statute. This conclusion merely respects the plain language of all the relevant statutes.

The majority does not argue a claim cannot accrue twice. Indeed, the revival statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (c)), read together with the delayed discovery statute (id., subd. (a)), necessarily causes previously accrued claims for sexual molestation to accrue a second time by prescribing the time for commencing an action in terms of delayed discovery. Although, “ ‘[generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at “the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements[,]” [a]n important exception to the general rule of accrual is the “discovery rule,” which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.’ ” (Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 634 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 735 , 151 P.3d 1151 ], quoting Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d 914 ].) Thus, plaintiff’s claim accrued once in 1979, when all the elements of her cause of action first existed, and once again in 2003, when her delayed discovery of psychological injury as an adult brought her claim within the revival statute.

To argue a claim cannot accrue twice would, in effect, nullify the revival statute. Eschewing this absurdity, the majority instead reasons the Legislature’s silence, when it drafted the revival statute, on the subject of claim presentation must mean the Legislature did not intend the revival statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (c)) to affect “the accrual of the cause of action” (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a)) for purposes of the claim presentation statute (ibid.). (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 211-212.) But the argument fails because, as already noted, the Legislature had already expressly provided that a claim accrues for purposes of claim presentation at the same time it accrues under the applicable statute of limitations (Gov. Code, § 901), which in this case is the delayed discovery statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (a)). Because the Legislature had already redefined accrual in terms of delayed discovery, the Legislature’s later silence on the point proves nothing. In any event, we ordinarily will not invoke legislative history to justify interpreting a statute contrary to its plain language. (E.g., City & County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo (1995) 10 Cal.4th 554, 572, fn. 10 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 896 P.2d 181 ].) Although exceptions to that rule are occasionally admitted in extreme cases, to argue that legislative silence can justify ignoring a statute’s plain meaning stands the ordinary rule on its head. At the very least, the burden of proving the Legislature did not mean what it said would seem to be on the one making the argument. The Legislature’s silence does not help the majority carry that burden.

*216 The majority also argues, apparently in the alternative, that the revival statute does not apply to this case. The majority reasons that plaintiff’s claim was barred not “solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (c), italics added), but also because she has not complied with the claim presentation statute. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 211.) But this additional argument obviously begs the question whether plaintiff has complied with the claim presentation statute. For the reasons given above, I conclude she has.

Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 10, 2007, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Werdegar, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.