Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1

Filed 8/28/17

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

LATRICE RUBENSTEIN, )

)

Plaintiff and Appellant, )

) S234269

v. )

) Ct.App. 4/1 D066722

DOE NO. 1 et al., )

) Imperial County

Defendants and Respondents. ) Super. Ct. No. ECU08107

____________________________________)

In 2012, plaintiff, Latrice Rubenstein, filed a claim with defendant Doe

No. 1 (defendant), a public entity, alleging that from 1993 to 1994, when she was

a high school student, her cross-country and track coach, who was defendant’s

employee, sexually molested her. When the claim was denied, she commenced

the instant action against defendant and defendants Does Nos. 2-20. She alleged

that latent memories of the sexual abuse resurfaced in early 2012, when she was

about 34 years old. As explained below, before suing a public entity, one must

generally present a timely claim to that entity. The question before us whether the

2012 claim concerning abuse that allegedly occurred from 1993 to 1994 was

timely. The Court of Appeal found the claim timely. We disagree.

A similar issue was before us in Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007)

42 Cal.4th 201 (Shirk). In Shirk, the plaintiff alleged that from 1978 to 1979, her

English teacher, an employee of the defendant school district, sexually molested

her. She filed a claim with the school district in 2003 and, shortly thereafter, sued

SEE DISSENTING OPINION.

the school district. “At the time of plaintiff’s sexual molestation in 1978 to 1979,

the applicable statute of limitations for sexual molestation was one year. (Former

[Code Civ. Proc.], § 340, subd. (3).)” (Id. at p. 207.) Thus, the cause of action

became barred under the statute of limitations. However, statutory changes

beginning in 1986 revived her action as far as the statute of limitations was

concerned. (Id. at pp. 207-208.) In the complaint, the plaintiff “alleged that on

September 12, 2003, when she consulted a licensed mental health professional, she

learned she was ‘suffering from psychological injuries’ caused by [the teacher’s]

sexual abuse of her in 1978 and 1979, when she was a teenager.” (Id. at p. 210.)

On these facts, we held that, although the cause of action had been revived for

purposes of the statute of limitations, the claim against the public entity remained

untimely.

We explained that, subject to exceptions listed in Government Code section

905, “[b]efore suing a public entity, the plaintiff must present a timely written

claim for damages to the entity.” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 208.) Compliance

with the claim requirement is a condition precedent to suing the public entity.

“Complaints that do not allege facts demonstrating either that a claim was timely

presented or that compliance with the claims statute is excused are subject to a

general demurrer for not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”

(Id. at p. 209.) The claim must be presented “not later than six months after the

accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) A plaintiff may

apply for leave to present a late claim (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (a)), but only if

the application is presented “within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after

the accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (b).)

“Accrual of the cause of action for purposes of the government claims

statute is the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of limitations

applicable to a dispute between private litigants. (Gov. Code, § 901 . . . .)” (Shirk,

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supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 208-209.) The trial court in Shirk had “found that

plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on November 30, 1979 (the last possible act of

molestation).” (Id. at p. 210.) The plaintiff “did not submit a claim to the School

District until September 23, 2003, nearly 25 years after the last act of

molestation.” (Ibid.)

The Shirk plaintiff’s 2003 claim was clearly untimely if the cause of action

accrued for purposes of the claims requirement in November 1979 and did not

reaccrue later. In arguing the claim was timely, the plaintiff relied primarily on

the legislation that had revived causes of action for childhood sexual molestation

that were otherwise barred under the applicable statute of limitations. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 340.1 (section 340.1).) As explained in greater detail in Shirk, supra, 42

Cal.4th at pages 207-208, section 340.1 as it existed at the time of the molestation

and as subsequently amended between 1990 and 2002 both expanded the statute of

limitations for childhood sexual molestation and revived some causes of action

that had already lapsed. It made the action in Shirk no longer barred by the statute

of limitations.

The plaintiff in Shirk made two arguments why the claim was timely: First,

“that under section 340.1, subdivision (c), . . . her cause of action against the

School District reaccrued on September 12, 2003, when she discovered that her

present psychological injury was caused by [the teacher’s] sexual abuse of her

some 25 years earlier”; and, second, “that her duty to present her claim to the

School District, as required under the government claims statute, first arose on

September 12, 2003, when she discovered that her psychological injury was

caused by the teacher’s sexual abuse and presented her claim to the School

District.” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 210-211, italics added.) We rejected

both the section 340.1 and the delayed discovery arguments.

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Regarding the section 340.1 contention, we noted that the statute of

limitations was not at issue. “Rather, it is the claim presentation deadline

[citations] that is at issue . . . .” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 209.) We held that

section 340.1 did not affect that deadline. We focused on the language of section

340.1, subdivision (c), which revived certain claims for damages “that would

otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of

limitations has or had expired.” (Shirk, at p. 211, quoting § 340.1, subd. (c).) We

explained that “before a plaintiff can bring a cause of action against a public

entity, a timely claim must be presented to the entity; when no claim is timely

presented, however, such a cause of action is not barred ‘solely’ by lapse of the

applicable statute of limitations, the phrasing that the Legislature used in the

revival provision of subdivision (c). As explained earlier . . . the government

claim presentation deadline is not a statute of limitations. Had the Legislature

intended to also revive in subdivision (c) the claim presentation deadline under the

government claims statute, it could have easily said so. It did not. We thus

conclude that as of January 1, 2003, plaintiff’s causes of action against the School

District were barred by expiration of the time for presenting a claim to the School

District.” (Shirk, at p. 213.)

We found support for this conclusion “in the public policies underlying the

claim presentation requirement of the government claims statute. Requiring a

person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity,

before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly

remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar

harm to others. [Citations.] The requisite timely claim presentation before

commencing a lawsuit also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible

evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located.

[Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity,

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allows its governing board to settle meritorious disputes without incurring the

added cost of litigation, and gives it time to engage in appropriate budgetary

planning. [Citations.] The notice requirement under the government claims

statute thus is based on a recognition of the special status of public entities,

according them greater protections than nonpublic entity defendants, because

unlike nonpublic defendants, public entities whose acts or omissions are alleged to

have caused harm will incur costs that must ultimately be borne by the taxpayers.”

(Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 213.)

We have reiterated these policies more recently. “ ‘The claims statutes also

“enable the public entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to

avoid similar liabilities in the future.” ’ ” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa

Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 991; see City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007)

42 Cal.4th 730, 738 [similar]; Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209

Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234 [summarizing these policy considerations].)

In Shirk, we also rejected the plaintiff’s delayed discovery argument that

the plaintiff’s “duty to present a claim to the School District did not arise until

September 12, 2003, when at the age of 41 she first learned from a mental health

practitioner that her adult-onset emotional problems resulted from [the teacher’s]

molestation of her as a teenager, some 25 years earlier.” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th

at p. 214.) We explained “that the Legislature’s amendment of section 340.1,

subdivision (c), revived for the year 2003 certain lapsed causes of action against

nonpublic entities, but that nothing in the express language of those amendments

or in the history of their adoption indicates an intent by the Legislature to apply

against public entity defendants the one-year revival provision for certain causes

of action. (§ 340.1, subd. (c).) In light of that conclusion, it seems most unlikely

that the Legislature also intended revival applicable to persons who discovered

only in 2003 a new injury attributable to the same predicate facts underlying a

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cause of action previously barred by failure to comply with the government claims

statute.” (Ibid.)

Shirk agreed with County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127

Cal.App.4th 1263, 1269, which, as we described it, similarly “held that the

Legislature’s 2002 amendment of section 340.1 did not reflect the Legislature’s

intent ‘to excuse victims of childhood sexual abuse’ from complying with the

government claims statute when suing a public entity defendant.” (Shirk, supra,

42 Cal.4th at p. 207.)

Justice Werdegar dissented in Shirk. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 214-

216 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) She recognized that the plaintiff’s claim first

accrued in 1979 but contended that the “claim accrued again in 2003.” (Id. at p.

214.) She argued that the “applicable statute of limitations, which in this case is

the delayed discovery statute [i.e., section 340.1], defines accrual for purposes of

the claim presentation statute. (See Gov. Code, § 901.) Having redefined accrual

in the applicable statute of limitations, the Legislature necessarily redefined

accrual, and plaintiff’s obligations, under the claim presentation statute.” (Shirk,

at pp. 214-215.)

Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, is factually distinguishable. In Shirk, the

cause of action had lapsed and was later revived. (Id. at pp. 207-208.) In this

case, plaintiff’s claim never actually lapsed. Instead, statutory changes extended

the time period before it lapsed.1 Because of this, plaintiff’s cause of action was

1 At the time of the alleged molestation, the limitation period for plaintiff’s

claim was eight years following the age of majority (i.e., to age 26) “or within

three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered

that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused

by the sexual abuse, whichever occurs later.” (Former § 340.1, subd. (a), as

amended by Stats.1990, ch. 1578, § 1, p. 7550.) As of that time, a plaintiff could

not bring an action against a third party such as defendant. But in 1998, section

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never barred “solely because the applicable statute of limitations . . . had expired.”

(§ 340.1, subd. (c).) But, for the following reasons, we believe Shirk’s reasoning

leads to the conclusion that this action is barred for failure to file a timely claim.

As noted, the claim must be presented “not later than six months after the

accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a), italics added.)

The cause of action here accrued at the time of the alleged molestation. (Shirk,

supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 210.) Plaintiff could have sued at that time. We must

340.1 was amended to permit an action against certain third parties. The 1998

amendment provided that the limitations period within section 340.1, subdivision

(a), applied “for any of the following actions: [¶] (1) An action against any person

for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse. [¶] (2) An action for liability

against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a

wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the

childhood sexual abuse which resulted in injury to the plaintiff. [¶] (3) An action

for liability against any person or entity where an intentional act by that person or

entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse with resulted in the injury to

the plaintiff.” (Former § 340.1, subd. (a), as amended by Stats.1998, ch. 1032,

§ 1, p. 7785.) The 1998 amendments also provided that no claim against a third

party “may be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday.” (Former

§ 340.1, subd. (b), added by Stats. 1998, ch. 1032, § 1, p. 7785.)

The most recent change to section 340.1 came in 2002, when defendant was

still under the age of 26 years. This time, the Legislature amended section 340.1,

subdivision (b), to provide that a plaintiff may bring a claim against a third party

even after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday “if the person or entity knew or had reason

to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an

employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps,

and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct

in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding

placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with

children is an inherent part of that function or environment.” (§ 340.1, subd.

(b)(2), as amended by Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1, pp. 752-753.) Plaintiff relies on

this theory in her lawsuit.

In sum, whenever plaintiff’s claim came close to expiring, the

Legislature expanded the statute of limitations. (See Quarry v. Doe I

(2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 974 [“an enlarged limitations period is considered to

apply prospectively and appropriately to actions that are not already barred

even if the conduct occurred prior to the enactment”].)

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decide whether the changes to section 340.1 caused it to reaccrue at a later time.

Shirk held the changes did not do so, at least for causes of action that had lapsed

and been revived. But plaintiff argues, and the Court of Appeal found, that a

claim that had never lapsed did reaccrue under section 340.1.

In support of this conclusion, plaintiff and the Court of Appeal rely largely

on Government Code section 901, which provides that “[f]or the purpose of

computing the time limits prescribed by [Government Code] Sections 911.2,

911.4, 945.6, and 946.6, the date of the accrual of a cause of action to which a

claim relates is the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have

accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable

thereto if there were no requirement that a claim be presented to and be acted upon

by the public entity before an action could be commenced thereon.” The Court of

Appeal stated: “The accrual date for claim filing purposes is the same as the

accrual date for a corresponding civil cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 901.) Code

of Civil Procedure section 340.1 sets forth the limitations period for filing an

action for childhood sexual abuse. (Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 952

(Quarry).) Thus, section 340.1 governs the accrual date for claim filing

purposes.”

The Court of Appeal’s analysis presents the question of whether section

340.1 provides a new accrual date for purposes of Government Code section 901’s

claims presentation rule. We have distinguished between statutes that postpone

the accrual date for an action and statutes that temporarily suspend the running of

a statute of limitations without affecting the accrual date. In Cuadra v. Millan

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 855, 864-865, disapproved on other grounds in Samuels v. Mix

(1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 16, fn. 4, we quoted Witkin as “correctly” stating, “ ‘The

statute [of limitations] may be tolled (i.e., its operation suspended) by various

circumstances, events or acts.’ (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Actions,

8

§ 407, p. 513, italics added.)” We further explained, “Similarly, statutes and case

law prescribe a number of rules postponing the accrual of a cause of action until a

specified event occurs . . . . Some judicial opinions loosely describe such rules as

‘tolling the statute of limitations,’ but again Witkin puts it more accurately: ‘The

foregoing rules of delayed accrual are to be distinguished from rules that, despite

accrual of the cause of action, toll or suspend the running of the statute.’ (3

Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Actions, § 462, pp. 582-583, italics in original.)”

(Cuadra v. Millan, at p. 865, fn. 11; see 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008)

Actions, § 496, p. 635.)

Shirk’s reasoning suggests that, like a tolling statute, section 340.1 does not

postpone the date of accrual. We thus agree with V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified

School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 499, in which the court similarly held that the

section did not provide a new accrual date.

“In making this argument, [the plaintiff] confounds the principles of

limitations periods and accrual dates. Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery. Inc. (2005)

35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807, clarified the distinction between and purposes of the two

concepts: ‘ “Statute of limitations” is the collective term applied to acts or parts of

acts that prescribe the periods beyond which a plaintiff may not bring a cause of

action. [Citations.] There are several policies underlying such statutes. One

purpose is to give defendants reasonable repose, thereby protecting parties from

“defending stale claims, where factual obscurity through the loss of time, memory

or supporting documentation may present unfair handicaps.” [Citations.] A

statute of limitations also stimulates plaintiffs to pursue their claims diligently.

[Citations.] A countervailing factor, of course, is the policy favoring disposition

of cases on the merits rather than on procedural grounds. [Citations.] [¶] A

plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause

of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 312 [“Civil actions, without exception, can only be

9

commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action

shall have accrued”]; Norgart [v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383,] 397.) In

other words, statutes of limitations do not begin to run until a cause of action

accrues. (Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 487.) [¶]

Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at “the time when the cause of

action is complete with all of its elements.” [Citations.]’

“Keeping these principles in mind, we conclude that while section 340.1

extends the time during which an individual may commence a cause of action

alleging childhood sexual abuse, it does not extend the time for accrual of that

cause of action.” (V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 139

Cal.App.4th at pp. 509-510, italics added.)

In this respect, section 340.1 is comparable to Code of Civil Procedure

section 340.2 , subdivision (a), which creates a statute of limitations for asbestos-

related injuries of “one year after the date the plaintiff first suffered disability”

(id., subd. (a)(1)) or “one year after the date the plaintiff either knew, or through

the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that such disability was

caused or contributed to by such exposure” (id., subd. (a)(2)).

In Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127 (Hamilton), we

concluded that this provision is not a typical accrual rule. The plaintiff in

Hamilton was exposed to asbestos from the early 1940s to 1963. He was

diagnosed with asbestosis in 1979, but was not disabled. His conditioned

worsened, and he filed suit against various asbestos manufacturers in 1993. In

1996, he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a form of cancer that is also caused

by exposure to asbestos. He then filed a second suit against the asbestos

manufacturers. At issue was whether Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2,

subdivision (a)’s statute of limitations barred the second suit. We held that the suit

was not time-barred. We explained: “Although section 340.2 applies only to

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actions for injury or illness arising from asbestos exposure, the statute does not

make the limitations period run from the date of that injury or illness or its

discovery, as similar statutes commonly provide. [Citation.] Subdivision (a) of

section 340.2 selects a different date, making the limitations period run instead

from the date the plaintiff suffered ‘disability’ and discovered that the disability

was caused by asbestos exposure.” (Hamilton, at p. 1138.) Before section 340.2

was enacted, we said, the accrual date for asbestos-related injuries “was also the

date of the beginning of the limitations period in cases in which the latent injury or

disease arose from exposure to asbestos. [Citation.] But section 340.2 changed

that rule, declaring a separate and distinct date for the beginning of the limitations

period in asbestos cases, i.e., the date of disability as specially defined in the

statute. The result . . . is that although the filing of an action for asbestos-related

injury may be said . . . to be an ‘admission’ that the cause of action has accrued in

the ripeness sense, it is not an admission that the limitations period of section

340.2 has simultaneously begun.” (Hamilton, at pp. 1144-1145.)

Section 340.1 is similar to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2,

subdivision (a). While a cause of action for childhood sexual abuse generally

accrues much earlier “in the ripeness sense” — a plaintiff will have a ripe cause of

action that could be brought much closer in time to the alleged abuse — section

340.1 creates “a separate and distinct date for the beginning of the limitations

period” (Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1144-1145) in certain child sex abuse

cases involving latent injuries, i.e., “the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably

should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age

of majority was caused by the sexual abuse.” (§ 340.1, subd. (a).)

Government Code section 901’s reference to “accrual” of the cause of

action for which a claim must be made tracks Hamilton’s distinction between

accrual in “the ripeness sense” (Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1145) — i.e., the

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time at which all the elements of a cause of action are present — and the

beginning of a separate, extended limitations period for latent injury stemming

from the same known wrongful act. Plaintiff’s cause of action had accrued in the

ripeness sense at the latest in 1994, the time of the last alleged molestation.

Section 340.1 did not cause it to reaccrue.

Our holding in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, supports this conclusion. If

Government Code section 901’s reference to “accrual” had encompassed the

beginning of a separate, extended limitations period for latent injury stemming

from known abuse, then presumably the plaintiff’s claim in Shirk would have been

timely, whether or not she had filed a timely claim immediately after the abuse

occurred. Shirk expresses the contrary conclusion that, for purposes of the claim

presentation requirement, the cause of action accrued when the abuse occurred —

and, additionally, no cause of action accrued at the time the latent injury stemming

from the abuse was discovered.

Our opinion in Quarry also reflects this understanding of Shirk’s

implications: “[I]f adult psychological injury were a separate injury giving rise to

a cause of action accruing upon discovery of the connection between the adult

injury and childhood abuse, presumably Shirk should have been litigated and

resolved differently. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201.) There we pointed out that

causes of action accrue for childhood sexual abuse at the same time for the

purpose of claims against public entities under the government claims statute (see

Gov. Code, § 911.2), and for the purpose of an ordinary civil action. (Shirk,

supra, at p. 210.) The plaintiff in Shirk contended that her claim under the

government claims statute was timely because she had only recently discovered

that her adult psychological injury was caused by childhood sexual abuse by one

of the defendant’s employees. (Id. at p. 206.) We said that she could not take

advantage of the revival period of section 340.1, subdivision (c) because it did not

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refer to claims made under the government claims statute. (Shirk, supra, at

pp. 212–214.) But if the plaintiff’s adult psychological injury were a separate

injury giving rise to a new cause of action with its own accrual date, the plaintiff

in Shirk would not have needed to rely upon the one-year revival period of

subdivision (c) — her claim would not have accrued at all, whether as a civil

action or under the government claims statute, until she became aware of her adult

injury.” (Quarry v. Doe I, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 982-983, fn. 11.)

Thus, the logical implication of Shirk’s rejection of the plaintiff’s

alternative argument that her government claim was timely filed under the delayed

discovery rule — an implication underscored by this court’s later decision in

Quarry — undermines a finding of timeliness in this case.

Moreover, the public policies behind the claim presentation requirement

that we identified in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, apply equally here as in that

case. Permitting a claim made in 2012 to suffice for molestation that allegedly

occurred from 1993 to 1994 would contravene those policies. A public entity

cannot plan for a fiscal year if it may be subject to an unknown and unknowable

number of ancient claims like this one. It is probably too late today to

meaningfully investigate the facts behind the claim and reach reliable conclusions;

even if some investigation is still possible, a claim timely filed in 1993 or 1994

would certainly have been easier to investigate and would have allowed for more

reliable conclusions. It is also too late to prevent the alleged abuser from abusing

again.

Recent legislation in response to Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, demonstrates

that the Legislature, in amending the statutory scheme, has endeavored to take

account of these policy concerns. “In direct response to Shirk, the Legislature

enacted Government Code section 905, subdivision (m) . . . .” (A.M. v. Ventura

Unified School Dist. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1258; see Stats. 2008, ch. 383,

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§ 1, pp. 3002-3003.) Government Code section 905 provides exceptions to the

government claims requirement. The new subdivision (m) of that section added

another exception: “Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil

Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual

abuse. This subdivision shall apply only to claims arising out of conduct

occurring on or after January 1, 2009.” (Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m).) This

amendment does not directly apply here. No one is arguing that the claim

requirement does not apply to plaintiff at all; instead, the parties are disputing

whether her claim was timely under then-existing law. But the amendment shows

that the Legislature has attempted to balance the important objectives underlying

the statutory scheme with practical concerns about permitting the litigation of old

claims against governmental entities.

The legislative history behind the new Government Code section 905,

subdivision (m), makes clear the Legislature overruled Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th

201, only prospectively due to fiscal considerations. A committee report

explained: “This bill is intended to address the Shirk decision by expressly

providing that childhood sexual abuse actions against public entities are exempted

from the government tort claims requirements and the six-month notice

requirement. It is identical to SB 1339 (Simitian), except that this bill applies

prospectively only, to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January

1, 2009. SB 1339 passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously, but

was held in suspense in the Senate Appropriations. The change from SB 1339

should reduce the bill’s financial impact on local public entities.” (Assem. Com.

on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 640 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.), as amended

June 9, 2008, p. 3; see Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 640 (2007-2008

Reg. Sess.), as amended July 14, 2008, pp. 1, 3 [similar].)

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In this way, during the calendar year 2008, the Legislature put

governmental entities on notice that for conduct allegedly occurring on or after

January 1, 2009, they would have to protect themselves as best they could against

possible stale claims. But the Legislature also intended to protect those entities

from such claims for conduct occurring before that date. This legislative intent

supports our conclusion that plaintiff’s 2012 claim for conduct allegedly occurring

from 1993 to 1994 was untimely.

Our opinion in Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at page

808, listed section 340.1 as among the statutes affecting the accrual date. But the

instant issue was not before us in that case, and the listing contained no analysis.

Our more recent opinion in Quarry v. Doe I, supra, 53 Cal.4th 945, which, as

explained, considered Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, and aptly explained its

significance, correctly described section 340.1 as “tolling the limitations period for

the underlying claim.” (Quarry, at p. 981, italics added.)

Plaintiff also argues that “the equitable doctrine of delayed discovery

applies and warrants a finding that plaintiff’s claim was timely.” However, once

we conclude, as we do, that section 340.1 did not establish a new accrual date, our

reasons for rejecting a similar argument in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 214,

apply here. We there explained that “it seems most unlikely” the Legislature

intended to permit a late claim for someone who discovered only in 2012 “a new

injury attributable to the same predicate facts underlying a cause of action

previously barred by failure to comply with the government claims statute.”

(Ibid.) As we concluded in Quarry v. Doe 1, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 984, “we

do not believe the Legislature intended that common law delayed discovery

principles should apply to cases governed by section 340.1.”

Finally, plaintiff makes the closely related argument that her delayed adult

awareness of her injury created its own cause of action with its own accrual date.

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We disagree for similar reasons. In Quarry v. Doe I, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pages

981-983, we considered the various amendments to section 340.1. We explained

that the 1990 amendment “did not treat adult psychological injury as an entirely

separate and new injury.” (Quarry, at p. 982.) Later amendments were also

“inconsistent with the view that adult injury constitutes a separate and distinct

injury giving rise to a new cause of action with its own limitations period.”

(Ibid.)2

The dissent complains that today’s holding, and presumably that of Shirk,

supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, effectively give public entities immunity from liability for

lawsuits like this one. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 2.) When the Legislature amended

section 340.1 without modifying the claims requirement, and later overruled Shirk,

but only prospectively, it took measured actions that protected public entities from

potential liability for stale claims regarding conduct allegedly occurring before

January 1, 2009, in which the public entity had no ability to do any fiscal planning,

or opportunity to investigate the matter and take remedial action.

2 K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229

erroneously concluded that section 340.1 affected the accrual date of a claim for

childhood sexual abuse, and that the delayed discovery doctrine made the late

claim timely. (K.J., at pp. 1233, 1241-1244.) We disapprove K.J. v. Arcadia

Unified School Dist., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 1229 to the extent it is inconsistent

with this opinion.

16

For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and

remand the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

CHIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

KRUGER, J.

17

DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.

I disagree with the court’s conclusion that plaintiff Rubenstein’s suit is

barred. The court holds her cause of action accrued when she was molested by a

high school track coach, at the age of 14, and then lapsed six months later when

she failed to present a claim to the school district. This reasoning, in my view,

reflects a misunderstanding of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 (hereafter

section 340.1) and its relationship to the statutes that regulate the government-

claims process (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.). I respectfully dissent.

Section 340.1 permits a victim of childhood sexual abuse to bring suit

“within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within

three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered

that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused

by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later . . . .” (Id., subd. (a).) The

1990 legislation that added this language to section 340.1 (Stats. 1990, ch. 1578,

§ 1, p. 7550) was intended to supersede DeRose v. Carswell (1987) 196

Cal.App.3d 1011. (See Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 963 (Quarry);

Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 108 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as

amended Feb. 6, 1989, pp. 2–3 [discussing DeRose].) Two years earlier, the court

in DeRose had held a claim based on sexual abuse accrued immediately based on a

simplistic analogy to the law of assault, under which a touching “perceived as

unconsented to and offensive . . . causes harm as a matter of law.” (DeRose, at

p. 1018.) DeRose met with harsh criticism in the Legislature, which was informed

that psychological evidence showed “most victims of childhood sexual abuse

either repress their memories of the abuse or are unable to appreciate their injuries

until well into their adult years.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill

No. 108, supra, at p. 3.) The Legislature responded by codifying the delayed

discovery rule in section 340.1, in order to “recognize the need for all victims of

childhood sexual abuse to be allowed a longer time period in which to become

aware of . . . their psychological injuries and remain eligible to bring suit.” (Sen.

Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 108, supra, at p. 2; see Quarry, at

p. 963.)

The Legislature’s landmark effort to expand victims’ access to the courts

does not help Latrice Rubenstein, the majority reasons, because section 340.1

tolls, or suspends the running of, the statute of limitations for childhood sexual

abuse claims rather than delaying those claims’ accrual. The arcane difference

between tolling and delayed accrual makes little or no difference to plaintiffs who

are suing private parties. But someone suing a public entity must present a claim

within six months after his or her cause of action accrues or the claim is lost.

(Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) By construing section 340.1 as a tolling statute,

while at the same time applying the deprecated rule that claims for childhood

sexual abuse accrue at the time of the abuse (maj. opn., ante, at p. 7), the majority

offers public entities the practical equivalent of immunity in the very set of cases

that prompted the Legislature to amend section 340.1 — cases in which the

psychological harm caused by childhood sexual abuse is first discovered in

adulthood. This result cannot fairly be attributed to the Legislature, which

amended section 340.1 over the strong objection of public school districts. (See

Nancy Bourne, Breon, O’Donnell & Miller, letter to Assembly Member Phillip

Isenberg, Aug. 9, 1989 [“The burden on a defendant such as a public school

2

teacher to prove he/she did not commit child abuse 30 years after the fact is

insurmountable.”]; see also Nancy Bourne, Breon, O’Donnell, Miller, Brown &

Dannis, letter to all Assembly Members, May 2, 1990 [same].)

Section 340.1 is most naturally read as delaying the accrual of claims for

sexual abuse rather than tolling the statute of limitations. The section sets “the

time for commencement of the action” by reference to “the date the plaintiff

discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness

occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse . . . .” (Id.,

subd. (a).) This is the language of delayed discovery—the “ ‘most important’ ”

exception to the ordinary rule that a “ ‘cause of action ordinarily accrues when . . .

the wrongful act is done and the obligation or liability arises . . . .’ ” (Brisbane

Lodging, L.P. v. Webcor Builders, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1257,

quoting 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 493, p. 633, and § 497,

p. 635.) The delayed discovery rule “ ‘postpones accrual of a cause of action until

the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.’ ” (Grisham

v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 634, quoting Fox v. Ethicon

Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806–807 (Fox).)

The legislative history of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 clearly and

repeatedly describes the statute as intended to delay accrual and not to toll the

statute of limitations. Multiple legislative committee reports explained the bill

“would expressly provide for delayed discovery accrual . . . .” (Sen. Com. on

Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 108, supra, at p. 2, as amended Feb. 6, 1989,

italics added; see Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill

No. 108 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) March 31, 1989, p. 1 [same]; Sen. Rules Com.,

Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 108 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.)

Aug. 20, 1990, p. 2 [same].) An enrolled bill report provided to the Governor

before he signed the legislation also describes the proposed legislation as

3

“provid[ing] for delayed discovery accrual . . . .” (Cal. Off. of Crim. Justice

Planning, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 108 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.)

prepared for Governor Deukmejian (Aug. 28, 1990) p. 1; see id., at p. 2 [same].)

One may infer the Legislature appreciated the distinction between delayed accrual

and tolling because the proposed legislation was described as “expressly

provid[ing] for delayed discovery accrual,” while then-existing law (Code Civ.

Proc., § 352) was described as “toll[ing] statutes of limitations during a plaintiff’s

minority.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 108, supra, at p. 2,

italics added.) In the entire legislative history, only a single sentence in a single

report uses the language of tolling to describe the effect of the proposed

amendment to section 340.1. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No.

108 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 21, 1989, p. 6 [under the proposed

amendment to section 340.1, “the running of the statute of limitation could be

tolled indefinitely”].) But this report does not mention or reject the commonly

expressed understanding that the amendment would in fact delay accrual.

Various public policies affecting the government claims process play a strong

role in the majority’s analysis. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 13–15; cf. id., at pp. 4–

5.) Those policies logically inform our interpretation of the statutes that regulate

the claims process. (See Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.) But the same policies do not

logically or legitimately inform the interpretation of generally applicable statutes

of limitations such as section 340.1. This is because the Legislature has declared

that the date on which a claim accrues, for purposes of the claims process, “is the

date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the

meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there

were no requirement that a claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public

entity before an action could be commenced thereon.” (Gov. Code, § 901, italics

added.) To construe section 340.1 as tolling the statute of limitations instead of

4

delaying its accrual—in order to serve the policies underlying the claims

process—is inconsistent with the Legislature’s decision to allow generally

applicable law to determine the date of accrual. (Gov. Code, § 901.) In other

words, section 901 expressly disallows accrual rules that are specific to the

government claims process, such as the majority’s novel pronouncement that

section 901 refers to accrual “ ‘in the ripeness sense.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)

The majority makes the same mistake by invoking Government Code section

905, subdivision (m), as support for its interpretation of section 340.1. (See maj.

opn., ante, at pp. 13–15.) Section 905 categorically exempts plaintiffs who sue

public entities for childhood sexual abuse from the need to submit claims.

Because this law applies “only to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or

after January 1, 2009” (Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m)), the majority describes the

amendment as showing a legislative concern about the financial impact on

governmental entities of older claims like that of plaintiff Rubenstein. (See Maj.

opn., ante, at pp. 13–14.) The Legislature is presumably always concerned with

the public treasury. But despite that proper concern, the Legislature has not

modified the statutory rule that claims accrue against public entities at the same

time they would accrue as “if there were no requirement that a claim be presented

. . . .” (Gov. Code, § 901, italics added.) Accordingly, the only reasonable

interpretation of section 905, subdivision (m), is that it does not affect the accrual

of claims based on pre-1990 conduct. (See City of Pasadena v. Superior Court

(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1340, 1352 [“Nor did the Legislature address the date of

accrual for such claims.”].) Instead, the timing of accrual is left to generally

applicable law, in this case section 340.1.

No controlling precedent supports the court’s interpretation of section 340.1.

The case law that does exist offers more opposition to, than support for, that

interpretation. In Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th 797, 808, albeit in dictum, we described

5

section 340.1 as “making accrual of a cause of action contingent on when a party

discovered or should have discovered that his or her injury had a wrongful cause.”

(Italics omitted.) Not in dictum, the Court of Appeal in K.J. v. Arcadia Unified

School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1241–1243, held that section 340.1

delays the accrual of claims for childhood sexual abuse until the plaintiff discovers

that adult psychological injury was caused by childhood sexual abuse. The

majority summarily disapproves that adverse precedent in a footnote (maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 16, fn. 2) and relies instead on V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.

(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 499. But V.C., like the majority, commits the error of

interpreting section 340.1 through the lens of the government claims process. V.C.

ultimately depends on the premise that to read section 340.1 as delaying accrual

would in effect “override” (V.C., at p. 511) or “carve out an exception to the

claims requirements.” (V.C., at p. 512.) This method of analysis is illegitimate, as

I have explained (ante, at pp. 2–3), given the Legislature’s decision to apply

generally applicable law to determine when a cause of action accrues for the

purpose of a claim against the government. (See Gov. Code, § 901.)

The remaining decisions on which the majority relies provide no meaningful

support for their conclusion. Neither Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42

Cal.4th 201 (Shirk), nor Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th 945, decided whether section

340.1 is properly interpreted as tolling, or as delaying the accrual of, claims for

childhood sexual abuse. And Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127

(Hamilton), interpreted a statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.2) that is

critically different than section 340.1.

In Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, the plaintiff conceded her cause of action for

sexual abuse committed by a high school teacher between 1977 and 1979 had been

extinguished by her failure to present a claim in 1980. (Id. at p. 210.) In view of

this concession, the question before the court was whether a 2002 amendment to

6

section 340.1 (see Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1, p. 753 [adding § 340.1, subd. (c)]) had

revived her claim. The amended statute revived only those causes of action that

were barred “solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had

expired” (§ 340.1, subd. (c), italics added) as of January 1, 2003. We held the

statute did not revive the plaintiff’s claim because it was “not barred ‘solely’ by

lapse of the applicable statute of limitations” (Shirk, at p. 213), but also because

she had not presented a timely claim to the school district (ibid.). The plaintiff

made the alternative argument that her claim first accrued when she learned the

abuse had caused adult psychological harm. (Id. at p. 214.) The court did not

dispose of that argument by interpreting 340.1 as tolling, rather than delaying the

accrual, of claims. Instead, the court simply reiterated its earlier conclusion that

the 2002 amendment had not revived plaintiff’s already extinguished claim.

(Ibid.)

Our decision in Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th 945, also concerned the 2002

revival statute. (§ 340.1, subd. (c).) The court held the plaintiff’s claims against a

church for sexual molestation committed by a priest were not revived because the

plaintiffs had failed to bring their action within the one-year period prescribed by

the revival statute. Arguing against this conclusion, the plaintiffs’ asserted “their

adult psychological injuries were so separate from the original childhood injuries

that a new claim accrued when they discovered the connection between their adult

injuries and the childhood abuse” and that, in consequence, they “had no need for

the revival of their previously barred claims.” (Quarry, at p. 981, italics added.)

We rejected the argument because “[t]here [was] no indication in [section 340.1]

that the Legislature viewed adult psychological injury caused by childhood abuse

as a new and separate injury giving rise to a new cause of action with its own

accrual and limitations period.” (Quarry, at p. 982.) This holding sheds no light

on the case before us. Plaintiff Rubenstein does not argue that her present claim,

7

which includes damages for adult psychological harm, is separate from her claim

for the childhood molestation. Instead, she argues she has a single claim for all

injuries caused by sexual molestation, and that section 340.1 delayed its accrual.

The majority tries to find some guidance in Quarry’s treatment of Shirk,

supra, 42 Cal.4th 201. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12–13.) But in the passage on

which the majority relies, the Quarry court went no farther than to hold, once

again, that a claim for adult psychological injuries caused by childhood sexual

abuse is not separate from a claim based on the assault itself.1 Quarry did not

hold that section 340.1 tolls the statute of limitations, rather than delaying accrual,

until adult harm is discovered. That question was not before the court.

The majority makes much of a single sentence in Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th

945, noting the 1990 amendment to section 340.1 was intended “to recognize that

a delayed awareness that adult psychological injury was caused by childhood

abuse would justify tolling the limitations period for the underlying claim against

the perpetrator.” (Quarry, at p. 981, italics added, quoted in maj. opn., ante, at

p. 15.) But this sentence cannot fairly be understood to reject, even in dictum, the

argument that section 340.1 provides for delayed discovery accrual, as the

Legislature intended. Instead, the sentence provides context for the sentences that

immediately follow, wherein the court again reiterates its holding that “the

1 See Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pages 982–983, footnote 11: “We also

observe that if adult psychological injury were a separate injury giving rise to a

cause of action accruing upon discovery of the connection between the adult injury

and childhood abuse, presumably Shirk should have been litigated and resolved

differently. . . . [I]f the plaintiff’s adult psychological injury were a separate

injury giving rise to a new cause of action with its own accrual date, the plaintiff

in Shirk would not have needed to rely upon the one-year revival period of

subdivision (c)—her claim would not have accrued at all, whether as a civil action

or under the government claims statute, until she became aware of her adult

injury.” (Italics added.)

8

amendment did not treat adult psychological injury as an entirely separate and new

injury. Rather, the new language [of section 340.1] was intended to afford victims

a longer period in which to become aware of their injuries.” (Quarry, at p. 982.)

The Quarry court also described the 1990 amendment consistently with its

legislative history as creating a “statutory delayed discovery rule” that would

supersede DeRose, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011. (Quarry, at p. 983.)

Finally the majority relies on Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th 1127. (See maj.

opn., ante, at pp. 10–12.) But Hamilton had nothing to do with section 340.1.

Hamilton construed Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2, subdivision (a), which

provides that, “[i]n any civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to

asbestos, the time for the commencement of the action” is “[w]ithin one year after

the date the plaintiff first suffered disability” or “either knew, or through the

exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that such disability was

caused or contributed to by such exposure.” As the Hamilton court explained, the

“intent of the Legislature in enacting section 340.2 . . . was . . . to provide a special

statute of limitations for asbestos-related illnesses consistent with the fact that

such slowly developing occupational diseases typically become symptomatic long

before they become disabling, at least in the sense of disabling their victims from

continuing to do their regular job.” (Hamilton, at p. 1139.) Given the purpose of

the statute, the court construed it as declaring a “date for the beginning of the

limitations period in asbestos cases” that was “separate and distinct” (id. at

pp. 1144–1145) from the date on which the claim accrued. In other words, while

“the filing of an action for asbestos-related injury may be said . . . to be an

‘admission’ that the cause of action has accrued in the ripeness sense, it is not an

admission that the limitations period of section 340.2 has simultaneously begun.”

(Hamilton, at p. 1145.)

9

The majority asserts that section 340.2 is similar to section 340.1. (Maj.

opn., ante, at p. 11.) Not so. The Legislature expressly limited the application of

section 340.2 “to those causes of action which accrued prior to the change in the

law” brought about by the enactment of section 340.2. (Stats. 1979, ch. 513, § 2,

p. 1690, italics added.) This uncodified statute made the holding in Hamilton,

supra, 22 Cal.4th 1127, unavoidable: The court could effectuate the purpose of

section 340.2 only by extending the limitations period for claims that had, by

definition already accrued. To interpret the statute as delaying the accrual of those

claims was not an option. In this critical respect, section 340.1 differs from

section 340.2. In 1990, when the Legislature amended section 340.1 to set “the

time for commencement of the action” by reference to “the date the plaintiff

discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness

occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse” (id., subd. (a)),

the Legislature did not limit the amended statute’s application to claims that had

already accrued, as it did with section 340.2. More importantly, as already

discussed (ante, at pp. 4–5), the Legislature understood the 1990 amendment

“would expressly provide for delayed discovery accrual . . . .” (Sen. Com. on

Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 108, supra, at p. 2, italics added.)

In conclusion, I urge the Legislature to read today’s decision and determine

for itself whether the majority’s holding accurately reflects the intended meaning

and purpose of section 340.1. “ ‘Statutes of limitation are products of legislative

authority and control’ ” (Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983)

33 Cal.3d 604, 615) and should reflect the Legislature’s policy goals rather than

those of the judicial branch. Prior judicial decisions unduly restricting sexual

abuse victims’ access to the courts have repeatedly led the Legislature to amend

10

both section 340.1 and the claims statutes.2 This case suggests section 340.1 may

require further clarification.

2 See Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pages 963–964 (noting the 1990 and 1994

amendments to section 340.1 superseded DeRose v. Carswell, supra, 196

Cal.App.3d 1011, and David A. v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 281);

City of Pasadena v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 1340,1352 (noting

Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m), superseded Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201). See also

Quarry, at pages 1002–1003 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).

11

For all of these reasons I respectfully dissent.

WERDEGAR, J.

WE CONCUR:

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

12

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 245 Cal.App.4th 1037

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S234269

Date Filed: August 28, 2017

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Imperial

Judge: Juan Ulloa

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Law Offices of Elliot N. Kanter, Elliott N. Kanter; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Holly N. Boyer and Shea S.

Murphy for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Family Violence & Sexual Assault Institute and Institute on Violence, Abuse & Trauma as Amici Curiae

on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Daley & Heft, Lee H. Roistacher, Richard J. Schneider, Reece A Roman; Jackson Lewis, Leila Nourani,

Sherry L. Swieca and Douglas M. Egbert for Defendants and Respondents.

Leone & Alberts, Louis A. Leone and Seth L. Gordon for Northern California Regional Liability Excess

Fund, Southern California Regional Liability Excess Fund, Statewide Association of Community Colleges

and School Association for Excess Risk as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities as Amici

Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Holly N. Boyer

Esner, Chang & Boyer

234 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 975

Pasadena, CA 91101

(626) 535-9860

Lee H. Roistacher

Daley & Heft

462 Stevens Avenue Suite 201

Solana Beach, CA 92075

(858) 755-5666

Seth L. Gordon

Leone & Alberts

2175 N. California Boulevard, Suite 900

Walnut Creek, CA 94596

(925) 974-8600