holding that “disgorgement of profits allegedly obtained by means of an unfair business practice” is not “an authorized remedy under the UCL where the profits are neither money taken from a plaintiff nor funds in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “disgorgement of profits allegedly obtained by means of an unfair business practice” is not “an authorized remedy under the UCL where the profits are neither money taken from a plaintiff nor funds in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest”
- explaining that restitution involves the return of money "to those persons in interest from whom the property was taken," while disgorgement, though it may include restitution, is not limited to the return of monies actually taken (emphasis supplied)
- explaining that penalty provisions, like § 226, cannot be enforced through § 17200, which permits a violation of another law to be actionable as an “unfair competitive practice” only if the remedy sought is equitable in nature
- explaining that the remedy sought by the plaintiffs was not “restitutionary because plaintiff *1105 d[id] not have an ownership interest in the money it s[ought] to recover from defendant's”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KENNARD, Acting C. J.
I concur in the majority opinion.
The majority holds that disgorgement of profits is not an available remedy under California’s unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, *1167 § 17200 et seq.) when the action is brought by an individual entity on its own behalf. This conclusion logically follows from this court’s decision in Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 , 999 P.2d 718 ] (Kraus). That case held that disgorgement of profits is not an available remedy in a representative action under the UCL when the case is not brought as a class action. Kraus explained: “[T]he Legislature has not expressly authorized monetary relief other than restitution in UCL actions, but has authorized disgorgement into a fluid recovery fund in class actions. Although the Legislature is well aware of the distinction between class actions and representative actions, it has not done so for representative UCL actions.” (Id. at p. 137.) On this issue, I agreed with the majority in Kraus .
I wrote separately in Kraus , however, because I was troubled by dictum in that case suggesting “ ‘it may be appropriate ... to condition payment of restitution to [nonparty] beneficiaries of a representative UCL action on execution of acknowledgement that the payment is in full settlement of claims against the defendant.’ ” (Kraus, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 142 (conc, opn. of Kennard, J.) quoting maj. opn., id. atpp. 138-139.) But here the issue of conditioning payment of restitution to nonparty beneficiaries in a representative UCL action is not implicated because this case involves an individual entity, the agent of unsuccessful bidders for a lucrative contract to supply military equipment to the Republic of Korea. Because plaintiff here paid no money to defendant successful bidder, I agree with the majority that plaintiff is not entitled to restitution. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1149.)