Opinion

Zukowsky v. Brown

  • 79 Wash. 2d 586
  • 488 P.2d 269
  • 1971 Wash. LEXIS 634
Court
Washington Supreme Court
Filed
Sep 2, 1971
Status
Published
Author
Rosellini
On the bench
Neill, Finley, Hunter, Rosellini
Cited by
62 cases
Authority
More cited than 11.2%

concluding that there was nothing so unreasonable or abnormal in the plaintiff's use of a helm seat of a boat to support a claim of her negligence or prevent the inference of defendant's negligence arising in the first instance

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that there was nothing so unreasonable or abnormal in the plaintiff's use of a helm seat of a boat to support a claim of her negligence or prevent the inference of defendant's negligence arising in the first instance
  • “Having determined that res ipsa loquitur applies, there remains the question of its procedural effect.”
  • plaintiff was injured when a sailboat’s helm seat on which she was sitting collapsed
  • the absence of negligence element is satisfied when "`the general experience and observation of mankind teaches that the result would not be expected without negligence'"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Rosellini, J.

(dissenting) — In my opinion, this case is one in which any verdict for the plaintiff must rest upon speculation and conjecture. Putting aside any question of possible contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, we are nevertheless confronted with the fact that the failure of the chair could well have been due to faulty design, faulty manufacture, or latent defects in the materials. All of these are possibilities, if none is a probability. For none of these causes would the boat owner be responsible, since he is not an insurer.

To me, the conclusion is inevitable that the jury had nothing to proceed upon except several conjectural theories, under one or more of which the defendant would be liable and under at least one of which he would not be liable. Under any view of res ipsa loquitur, it does not come into play unless the evidence shows that the occurrence in question is one which does not ordinarily happen unless the defendant has been negligent. Since there was no proof that an accident of this kind does not ordinarily happen unless the boat owner has been negligent, I do not see how *606 any inference of negligence can arise from the happening of the accident.

But, whether or not the jury is instructed on res ipsa loquitur, it is invited to speculate if it must render a verdict on such insubstantial evidence. If there is no evidence that the accident was more probably caused by one thing than another (and it seems to me that expert testimony is needed to establish causation in a case of this kind), the case should not go to the jury. Mason v. Turner, 48 Wn.2d 145 , 291 P.2d 1023 (1956).

The jury recognized that there was no proof that the defendant’s negligence, if there was such negligence, caused this accident. It gave the proper verdict and that verdict was properly upheld by the trial court when it entered judgment upon it.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not rescued from the alleged quagmire of confusion which supposedly surrounds it by a decision which makes it applicable to the factual situation presented here. I would keep my judicial boots out of that quagmire until we have before us a case in which the doctrine is legitimately and necessarily involved.

Upon the merits of that question, however, I find it impossible to conceive of the doctrine having any value to the jury unless the jury is instructed upon it. Where certain facts are found by the jury, 7 the law permits it to draw an inference. But, unless the jury is told that if it finds these facts it can draw this inference, the jury itself is left in a quagmire of confusion.

*607 The present case, in my judgment, should be quietly remanded with directions to reinstate the verdict.

Hale, J., concurs with Rosellini, J.

Petition for rehearing denied November 5,1971.

Is the accident one which does not ordinarily happen without negligence? Was the instrumentality which caused the accident under the control of the defendant?

(Here, the instrumentality was under the control of the defendant as far as its maintentance was concerned but not as far as its manufacture was concerned. Since the accident was not shown to have been more probably caused by defective maintenance than by defective mamifacture, the jury could not properly consider the question.)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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