repeated fires by spontaneous combustion unlikely; eight fires along one country road immediately after defend ant, Ms father and others drove by show “a deliberate plan to set them”
How later courts described this case
- repeated fires by spontaneous combustion unlikely; eight fires along one country road immediately after defend ant, Ms father and others drove by show “a deliberate plan to set them”
- repeated fires by spontaneous combustion unlikely; eight fires along one country road immediately after defend *136 ant, Ms father and others drove by show “a deliberate plan to set them”
- repeated fires by spontaneous combustion unlikely; eight fires along one country road immediately after defendant, his father and others drove by show "a deliberate plan to set them"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PEEEY, C. J.,
specially concurring.
I cannot subscribe to the conclusion reached by the majority, that the trial court was not in error in rejecting the defendant’s offer to show that the defendant was mentally incompetent to make a confession.
I am of the firm opinion that the majority are giving too broad an interpretation of the insanity or mental defect proviso in OES 185.870. (The statute is fully set forth in the majority opinion and is, therefore, not herein set out.) This statute in clear and unequivocal language permits the introduction of all material facts tending to establish a defense to a crime charged, and the proviso limits these facts, unless certain prescribed procedure is followed, solely to the introduction of facts relating to a mental condition of a defendant existing at the time of the commission of the act charged, which, if believed by the jury, would constitute a defense to the crime as charged in the in *189 dietment; that is, this statute deals with defenses and the proviso deals with an insanity or mental condition that would he such as to exonerate a defendant in the eyes of the law of the crime charged, or would be such as would reduce the degree of the crime.
Certainly this statute does not contemplate the defective mental condition of a defendant, which, although established, would not constitute a defense. In this case no one could reasonably contend that proof of the fact that the defendant was a “pathological liar” would exonerate him in the eyes of the law for the commission of the crime of arson.
In my opinion, under this statute the fact that a defendant’s mental condition is chronic does not make the evidence incompetent for the purpose of permitting a jury to evaluate the evidentiary weight to be given a confession, but does deny the defendant the right to have this evidence considered as a defense to the crime charged.
It is an established rule of law which needs no citation of authority that, although evidence offered may be inadmissible for one purpose, it may, nevertheless, be admissible for another, and the jury can then be instructed as to the extent and purpose to which they must consider this evidence in their deliberations. The fact that a jury might consider the evidence contrary to the instructions of the court certainly presents an unsound reason for its exclusion.
Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that the error of the trial court in refusing the defendant’s offer of proof, although error, was not prejudicial. This for the reason that the defendant offered evidence by his father that the confession was not true because the father was with his son at the time the alleged crime was committed and no fires were started by the son. *190 Had the jury believed the evidence of the father they could not have believed the defendant was telling the truth when he made his confession.
I, therefore, concur in the result reached by the majority.