stating that “[n]one of the police agent cases cited by defendant indicates that it would have been improper for the officers to grant an inmate’s relatives special visitation privileges in the unspoken hope that they might elicit statements from defendant and inform the officers thereof’
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[n]one of the police agent cases cited by defendant indicates that it would have been improper for the officers to grant an inmate’s relatives special visitation privileges in the unspoken hope that they might elicit statements from defendant and inform the officers thereof’
- holding that there was no error where a competent defendant first withdrew an insanity plea, then reinstated this plea against the advice of counsel; the court held that a presently sane defendant has control over this decision
- in which the Supreme Court of California held the decision whether or not to plead not guilty by reason of insanity is personal to the defendant and the trial court has no discretion to deny a defendant's motion to reinstate his insanity plea solely because counsel opposed that choice on tactical grounds
- "In determining the propriety of a particular proof allocation, a critical factor is the extent to which either party has access to the relevant information.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I dissent.
Defendant contends that the judgment must be reversed: the jury’s determination that he was mentally competent cannot stand without offense to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The majority reject the claim. After review, I am of the opinion that their analysis is erroneous and their conclusion unsound.
Prior to trial, on defense counsel’s motion the court declared a doubt about defendant’s mental competence and instituted proceedings on the question under the authority of the statutory scheme codified in Penal Code section 1367 and following. One of the provisions of that scheme is Penal Code section 1369, subdivision (f) (hereafter section 1369(f)), which allocates the burden of proof to the defendant: “It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent.” The parties introduced substantial, but sharply conflicting, evidence on the issue. The jury was instructed in accordance with section 1369(f). It subsequently returned a verdict finding defendant mentally competent.
The statutory scheme on mental competence is fundamentally flawed in its allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant, and therefore cannot support the verdict returned under its “authority.”
The due process clause prohibits the conviction of a person for a crime if he does not satisfy all the elements of the offense. (See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684, 691-704 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 508, 514-523 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 ].) Further, it bars conviction except on proof beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution of each of the elements. (E.g., In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ].)
Similarly, the due process clause prohibits the conviction of a person for a crime if he is not mentally competent. (See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson (1966) *914 383 U.S. 375, 378 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 815, 818 , 86 S.Ct. 836 ].) By parity of reasoning, it bars conviction except on proof beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution that the defendant is in fact mentally competent.
To be sure, the due process clause does not require the prosecution to prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt. (Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S. at pp. 705-706 [44 L.Ed.2d at pp. 523-524] (conc. opn. of Rehnquist, J.) [discussing In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. 358 , and Leland v. Oregon (1952) 343 U.S. 790 ( 96 L.Ed. 1302 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 )].) But an insanity defense is apparently not constitutionally mandated. (Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 91 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 71 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 ] (dis. opn. of Rehnquist, J.) [stating that “[i]t is highly doubtful that due process requires a State to make available an insanity defense to a criminal defendant”].) Further, it is an affirmative defense and as such comes into play only after the prosecution has proved the existence of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S. at pp. 705-706 [44 L.Ed.2d at pp. 523-524] (conc. opn. of Rehnquist, J.).)
The foregoing analysis, however, does not affect the conclusion that the due process clause does indeed require the prosecution to prove the defendant mentally competent beyond a reasonable doubt. Mental competence is in fact constitutionally mandated. Further, mental incompetence is not an affirmative defense that becomes operative only after proof of the crime at trial. “It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to trial.” (Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 171 [ 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 112-113 , 95 S.Ct. 896 ].)
Therefore, the statutory scheme for proceedings on mental competence is fundamentally flawed in its allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant, and as a result cannot support the verdict returned under its “authority” in this case. 1
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment in its entirety.
For purposes here, I need not and do not consider the separate question of the constitutionally proper allocation of the burden of producing evidence. (See generally 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, std. 7-4.8 (2d ed. 1986) p. 7.208; id., Commentary, at pp. 7.213 to 7.215.)