The opinion
*508 CLARK, J.
I concur' in affirming the judgment as to Reyes, but dissent from reversing the judgment as to Venegas.
An appellate justice normally does not hesitate to apply the substantial evidence rule when he personally believes the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, as agonizing as the responsibility may be, the justice must also follow the rule even when he personally doubts the defendant’s guilt. 1 In the latter case, the justice’s understandable horror of affirming the conviction of a possibly innocent man — reinforced by the human conceit that reasonable men would necessarily share his doubt— may lead him unconsciously to minimize the substantiality of the evidence supporting the conviction.
The majority’s perception of the evidence against Venegas appears to have become distorted in this manner. Despite the majority’s evident concern that he may actually be innocent, the jury’s conclusion that Venegas was one of two murderers is clearly supported by substantial evidence.
Henry Meade’s testimony that he heard two unfamiliar voices coming from the victim’s apartment shortly before the murder is itself substantial evidence that Reyes did not commit the crime alone. 2 Dismissing Mr. Meade’s testimony, the majority speculates that the two voices “are as likely to have been those of Reyes and the victim, or may even have emanated from the television set . . . .” (Ante, p. 497.) However, the jury’s rejection of these alternative explanations is supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Meade’s apartment was only 10 feet across a *509 courtyard from the victim’s, and both windows in the victim’s apartment were open. The victim had a distinctively loud voice. As manager of the apartment building in which the victim resided, Mr. Meade had encountered him almost every day for three years, becoming quite familiar with his voice. Mr. Meade was also familiar with the distinctive sound of the victim’s television set, which was “faint, old, and weak.” Mr. Meade testified the voices he heard did not sound as if they came from that set.
Moreover, there is substantial evidence that both Venegas and Reyes were observed fleeing the scene of the crime. Mrs. Penn’s testimony indicates the man she observed apparently arguing with Mr. Meade was Venegas. She described the man as wearing a brown jacket and a scarf or a beard. When arrested, Venegas was wearing a brown jacket and a beard. Dismissing Mrs. Penn’s testimony as “inherently insubstantial,” the majority asserts that it is overcome “as a matter of law” by the contradictory testimony of three “disinterested” witnesses (Mr. Meade, Mrs. Mallas and Mrs. Stoeltje), which “indubitably established” that the man was Reyes, that he was wearing a red and white short-sleeve shirt and tan trousers, and that he was clean shaven. (Ante, pp. 498-499.)
Aside from the fact that she was apparently somewhat farther away, the only reason given by the majority for characterizing Mrs. Penn’s testimony as “inherently insubstantial” is that “[tjhere is little light at 7 a.m. in late December, especially on a foggy and rainy morning, . . .” (Ante, p. 498.) Although the majority seems determined to view this case in the light most favorable to appellant Venegas — rather than respondent — there was no more light on that foggy, rainy late December morning for witnesses favorable to Venegas than for Mrs. Penn. Nor is there any indication in the record that she was less “disinterested” than they.
The jury was reasonably entitled to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in the descriptions given by Mrs. Penn (brown jacket; scarf or beard) and Mrs: Mallas (red and white short-sleeve shirt; clean-shaven) by concluding that Mrs. Penn saw Venegas and that Mrs. Mallas saw Reyes. Mrs. Mallas’ description, unlike Mrs. Penn’s, was not based on observation of the confrontation between Mr. Meade and the suspect carrying the television set. Mrs. Mallas simply saw “two heads bobbing,” lost sight of them, heard a crash, and seconds later saw the man she described run past her window.
At trial, Mrs. Stoeltje positively identified Reyes as the man Meade confronted, but the jury was reasonably entitled to reject her identification testimony for a reason the majority fails to disclose: Mrs. Stoeltje was legally blind in one eye when the crime was committed and the same *510 optic nerve disease was affecting the vision in her other eye when she testified six months later. When police brought defendants back to the scene Mrs. Stoeltje said she had never before seen either of them.
Mr. Meade testified that the man he confronted was wearing a “light” shirt, but added that the suspect may also have been wearing a jacket because his torso was obscured by the television set he was carrying. The suspect’s trousers were described by Mrs. Mallas as “light tan,” but Mr. Meade described them as “dark,” as were the trousers Venegas was wearing when apprehended.
Moreover, the People may rely on circumstantial evidence to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime and to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed it. (People v. Bynum (1971) 4 Cal.3d 589, 599 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 241 ,. 483 P.2d 1193 ]; People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 424 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 475 P.2d 649 ]; People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 395 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 379 , 461 P.2d 659 ].) The circumstantial evidence that Venegas was the other murderer is sufficiently substantial to support his conviction.
Mrs. Routh testified she saw Venegas and Reyes standing in the open doorway of the victim’s apartment the previous afternoon. But the majority dismisses Mrs. Routh’s testimony by pointing out that her credibility was impeached. {Ante, p. 494.) Again, evaluating Mrs. Routh’s credibility was within the exclusive province of the jury, and this court may not invade the jury’s province unless her testimony was “inherently improbable.” {People v. Pearson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 218, 221 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 449 P.2d 217 ]; People v. Lyons (1956) 47 Cal.2d 311, 320 [ 303 P.2d 329 ].) For statements to be inherently improbable, “there must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.” (People v. Pearson, supra; People v. Huston (1943) 21 Cal.2d 690, 693 [ 134 P.2d 758 ].) Mrs. Routh’s testimony was obviously not inherently improbable. Therefore, the jury was not only entitled to rely on it, but also to infer that defendants were lying when they contradicted her at trial. This inference is as damaging to Venegas as the testimony itself, because the most persuasive aspect of Venegas’ defense was Reyes’ attempted exoneration of him.
Substantial evidence places defendants together hours before and minutes after the crime, which occurred shortly before 7 a.m. Reyes testified he left his father’s party with Venegas between 4 and 6 a.m. Venegas told a police officer he returned from the party with Reyes about 5:30 a.m. They were apprehended a couple of blocks from the murder scene at 7:30 a.m.
*511 Moreover, a half hour earlier they were in a' bar in the same vicinity for 15 minutes. But the majority dismisses bartender Sanderson’s testimony by commenting that it “was somewhat impeached: he stated he was able to observe the men, whom he had never seen before, for only two or three seconds in a crowded bar and admitted he was not wearing his prescription glasses at the time.” {Ante, p. 499.) Once again the majority seems to have unconsciously minimized the substantiality of the People’s evidence. The bar was not “crowded.” There were 10-15 people in it and it was variously estimated as being 100 feet to 1 block long. Admittedly, Sander-son was not wearing his “prescription” glasses, but the record does not indicate the prescription was to remedy nearsightedness. Sanderson testified he did not require the glasses all the time, that he only wore them when his eyes bothered him. There is no indication in the record that Sanderson required his glasses to distinguish the features of men directly across the counter from him. Nor is there any indication in the record that Sander-son’s vision was as impaired as Mrs. Stoeltje’s, or that his opportunity for observation was as fleeting as Mrs. Mallas’. Sanderson observed defendants well enough to recall that Venegas ordered two draft beers, that Reyes then went to the telephone and turned his back on Sanderson, and that they paid with the correct change. Here, too, the inference Sanderson’s testimony permitted the jury to draw concerning Reyes’ credibility — that Reyes was lying to protect Venegas when he denied they were in the bar— was as damaging to Venegas’ defense as the testimony itself.
The substantial evidence rule is the most fundamental principle of appellate review. Its meaning must ultimately be found in the cases applying it. The majority alters its meaning today.
McComb, J., concurred.
An appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a feversal of the judgm.ent. The test on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 214 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 530 , 485 P.2d 1146 ]; People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 475 P.2d 649 ]; People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 395 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 379 , 461 P.2d 659 ].) “After the jury, and the trial judge ruling on a motion for new trial, have found defendant guilty, the presumption of innocence in the trial court is replaced by the presumption in favor of the judgment. A reversal can be ordered only if upon no rational hypothesis is there substantial evidence to support the judgment.” (People v. Miller (1969) 71 Cal.2d 459, 474 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 455 P.2d 377 ]; see People v. Bard (1968) 70 Cal.2d 3, 4-5 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 547 , 447 P.2d 939 ]; People v. Hillery (1965) 62 Cal.2d 692, 702-703 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 401 P.2d 382 ].)
Substantial evidence is “evidence that reasonably inspires confidence and is ‘of solid value.’ ” (People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 250 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 , 57 A.L.R.3d 1199 ]; People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 139 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 193 , 443 P.2d 777 ].)