Jefferson v. California Department of Youth Authority

MORENO, J.

I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to clarify what I believe to be the scope of and rationale for our holding.

As the majority correctly states: “[T]he Court of Appeal decisions that have considered the issue have been consistent in their view that the preprinted language in a workers’ compensation compromise and release form should be narrowly construed to apply only to workers’ compensation claims.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 309.) The majority makes clear that it neither approves or disapproves of two of these decisions (Lopez v. Sikkema (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 31 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 7 ]; Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 590 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 ]), and it approves of a third, Asare v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 856 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 452 ], on the grounds that extrinsic evidence was introduced that the release was not intended to apply to civil claims. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 309.)

Whatever the validity of the above-stated general rule that workers’ compensation releases apply only to workers’ compensation claims, the present case recognizes an exception to that rule. The majority distinguishes this case from Lopez and Delaney in part because, in the latter cases, the employees’ suits had already been filed at the time the release was executed. The distinction is significant because the employers in Lopez and Delaney were in at least as good a position as the employees to enumerate pending civil claims in the release, and therefore would not have to “struggle to enumerate all claims the employee might plan to allege.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 306.) In the present case, plaintiff had already filed a sex discrimination claim with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing under the Fair *312 Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) before she executed the release, but had not yet filed suit. Accordingly, plaintiff was in a better position than her employer to be aware of potential FEHA litigation. I agree with the majority that under this circumstance the burden should generally fall on the employee to except the contemplated litigation from a general release.

Thus, this is not a case in which the employee was unaware of potential civil claims. Nor is there any indication that the employee was misinformed or misled about the release: there was no extrinsic evidence of such misinformation, the employee was represented by counsel, and the consideration she received for signing the release was substantial. Given all the above circumstances, the majority correctly holds that the language of the compromise and release and attachment, releasing all claims including civil claims without exception, should be enforced.

Finally, I agree with Justice Kennard that the language of the preprinted form releasing civil claims may not be clear in all circumstances, especially given the informality of workers’ compensation proceedings, and that such language should be clarified and highlighted.