Opinion

Olszewski v. Scripps Health

  • 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1
  • 30 Cal. 4th 798
  • 2003 Daily Journal DAR 5822
  • 69 P.3d 927
  • 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4566
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Jun 2, 2003
Status
Published
Author
George
On the bench
George, Werdegar, Brown
Cited by
118 cases

holding that state statutes which permitted Medicaid providers to place liens and recover on claims against third parties who caused the Medicaid covered injuries were preempted to the extent the statutes permitted recovery beyond the Medicaid payment

How later courts described this case

  • holding that state statutes which permitted Medicaid providers to place liens and recover on claims against third parties who caused the Medicaid covered injuries were preempted to the extent the statutes permitted recovery beyond the Medicaid payment
  • invalidating a state stat-ule which authorized a provider to recover its customary fee through a lien against a judgment or settlement obtained by a Medicaid beneficiary against a third-party tortfeasor
  • invalidating a state statute which authorized a provider to recover its customary fee through a lien against a judgment or settlement obtained by a Medicaid beneficiary against a third-party tortfeasor
  • Medicaid statutes and regulations "are unambiguous and limit provider collections from a Medicaid beneficiary to, at most, the cost-sharing charges allowed under the state plan, even when a third party tortfeasor is later found liable for the injuries suffered by that beneficiary"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

GEORGE, C. J., Concurring.

I have signed the majority opinion, but I have done so on the understanding that the opinion does not create the overbroad “safe harbor” to which Justice Werdegar’s concurring opinion properly objects. I agree with Justice Werdegar that a business whose ongoing practices are found unlawful or unfair could not complain, on fairness grounds, “of being enjoined from further such violations” in the future, even if the business’s past conduct was based on what seemed to be an enforceable state law. (Cone. opn. of Werdegar, J., post, at p. 833.) And I also agree that a grant of monetary relief “is not necessarily unfair merely because the defendant business believed in good faith that its practice was lawful.” (Ibid.) In my view, the majority opinion need not, and should not, be read as inconsistent with these propositions.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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