deferring to the trial court because “[a]n appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant’s conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper,” and reasoning that “once a defendant has been found to be competent, even bizarre statements and actions are not enough to require a further inquiry” (internal citations and quotations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- deferring to the trial court because “[a]n appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant’s conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper,” and reasoning that “once a defendant has been found to be competent, even bizarre statements and actions are not enough to require a further inquiry” (internal citations and quotations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIN, J., Concurring
I concur fully in the majority opinion, including its conclusion that defendant’s arguments regarding impeachment with some of his prior convictions are not cognizable. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 227-229.) I write separately only to note that the arguments also lack merit.
The California electorate passed Proposition 8 in June 1982. A short time later, we held that it “applies only to prosecutions for crimes committed on or after its effective date.” (People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 258 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 692 , 667 P.2d 149 ].) Accordingly, when the charged crime predated Proposition 8, trial courts had to apply the law that existed before its adoption, including the law relating to impeachment with a prior conviction. (See, e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1056 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ].) Defendant, however, committed the charged crimes in 1990. Thus, this prosecution is for crimes committed long after Proposition 8’s effective date. The date of the charged crime matters, not the date of the prior conviction or its underlying crime. (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 607 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345 , 51 P.3d 224 ].) Accordingly, and contrary to defendant’s assertion, Proposition 8 applies to this trial. (E.g., People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 177-178, 186 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 , 841 P.2d 862 ] [applying post-Proposition-8 law to impeachment with a 1979 conviction where the charged crimes occurred in 1984]; see also People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826, 833 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 694 P.2d 736 ] [Proposition 8’s five-year enhancement for serious felony convictions applies when the prior conviction predates, but the charged crime postdates, Proposition 8].)
It has also long been settled that defendant’ s prior convictions involve moral turpitude. (People v. Lindsay (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 849, 854-858 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 529 ] [battery on a peace officer]; People v. Clarida (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 547, 552 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 363 ] [same]; People v. Standard (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 431, 435 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 62 ] [possession of marijuana for sale, noting that possession for sale, unlike simple possession, involves the intent to corrupt others].)
*239 The court’s choice not to discuss the merits of these forfeited arguments should not be read as casting doubt on any of this settled law.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 1, 2003.