The opinion
OPALA, V.C.J.,
with whom WATT, C.J. and EDMONDSON, J., join, concurring.
T 1 I concur in today's assumption of jurisdiction and in the issued command that the State Election Board place the petitioner's name on the general election ballot as an Independent candidate for the U.S. Congress from District No. 4.
I 2 The question presented by the petitioner's writ quest is whether she is a qualified candidate for the congressional office she seeks. The State Election Board ruled her disqualified by the provisions of 26 O.S. Supp.2004 § 5-105(A), 1 finding that she fails to meet that statute's requirement for an independent office-seeker who must be "a registered voter in ... [her] party for the six[-Imonth period immediately preceding the first day of the filing period prescribed by law."
T3 The body of public law that governs qualifications of a candidate for public office from this State is entirely statutory. 2 It may be neither supplemented nor diluted by the norms of common law injected into its corpus by an agency or by a judicial syringe. One's opportunity to seek a public office must stand unburdened by extra-statutory hurdles. This right is guaranteed and guarded by the Oklahoma Constitution, the State's highest law.
T4 This case is not about the constitutional validity of a restriction the present in-eumbent seeks to impose on the petitioner's candidacy; rather, it is about whether such restriction does in fact stand imposed by Oklahoma's fundamental law or by one of her statutes.
THE STATUTE INVOKED BY THE RESPONDENTS IS FACIALLY UNAMBIGUOUS
T5 The provisions of 26 0.S$.Supp.2004 § 5-105(A), the statute on which the respondents rely, are, by their express terms, unin-vocable against candidates who seek a federal office. This is so because federal office-seekers are not included among those to be affected by its provisions. Where a statute is plain and unambiguous, it will not be subject to judicial construction, but must be given the effect its language dictates. 3
*1094 II
A LONG-FOLLOWED ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION IS NOT BINDING ON THIS COURT WHEN IT IS PLACED BY AN AGENCY UPON AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE
T6 Administrative construction cannot override the plain language of a statute. 4 Where a statute is neither ambiguous nor of doubtful meaning, the rule that weight is to be given to an agency construction in determining the effect of the statute 5 will not be applied.
XII
NEITHER AN AGENCY NOR THIS COURT MAY BURDEN A FEDERAL OFFICE SEEKER WITH QUALIFICATIONS NOT IMPOSED BY FEDERAL OR STATE STATUTORY LAW
I 7 This case is not about the constitutional validity of the qualification that the respondents seek to inject but rather whether that very qualification is in fact imposed by state law. Neither an agency nor this court can foist upon a candidate qualifications for office that are not prescribed by written law. No voting- or election-related issue may be resolved by invoking a norm of unwritten law. 6 In short, there is no common law to aid the court in disposing of the contested issue here. The law's command that courts may not inject common-law solutions in resolving a candidate's qualifications for public office is persuasively informed by Oklahoma's firm constitutional commitment to the principle of providing unimpeded access for filing to those who desire to seek public office by election. 7 In sum, one who seeks public office is entitled to file as a candidate for election unless it clearly appear that one fails to meet a qualification prescribed for that office by the "written law"-Oklahoma's constitution or one of her legislative enactments. 8
IV
SUMMARY
8 I concur in today's assumption of original jurisdiction and in the issued command that the State Election Board place petitioner's name on the general election ballot as an Independent candidate for the U.S. Congress from District No. 4.
. The pertinent terms of 26 0.S. Supp.2004 § 5-105(A) are:
To file as a candidate for nomination by a political party to any state or county office, a person must have been a registered voter of that party for the six-month period immediately preceding the first day of the filing period prescribed by law and, under oath, so state....
{emphasis added).
. McClendon v. Slater, 1976 OK 112, ¶ 19 , 554 P.2d 774 ; Swindall v. State Election Board, 1934 OK 259 , ¶ 0 syl.1, 168 Okla. 97 , 32 P.2d 691 .
. Blitz U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 2003 OK 50, ¶ 14 , 75 P.3d 883, 888 ; Ross v. Peters, 1993 OK 8, ¶ 9, n. 17 , 846 P.2d 1107, 1119, n. 17 ; TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, 1992 OK 31, ¶ 5 , 829 P.2d 15, 20 ; Forston v. Heisler, 1961 OK 198, ¶ 11 , 363 P.2d 949, 951 . Only where the intent cannot be ascertained from a statute's text, as it occurs when ambiguity or conflict (with other statutes) is shown to exist, may rules of statutory construction be employed. Blitz, supra, at ¶ 14 , at 888; Cooper v. State ex rel. Dep't. of Public Safety, 1996 OK 49, ¶ 10 , 917 P.2d 466, 468 ; TXO Production Corp. v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 1992 OK 39 , ¶ 7, 829 P.2d 964, 969 ; Cox v. Dawson, 1996 OK 11, ¶ 6 , 911 P.2d 272, 276 .
. This court is not bound to follow administrative construction of an unambiguous statute. Neer v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 1999 OK 41, ¶ 15 , 982 P.2d 1071, 1078 ; City of Tulsa v. State ex rel. Public Employees Relations Bd., 1998 OK. 92, ¶ 14, 967 P.2d 1214, 1220 ; C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 1968 OK 127 , 450 P.2d 211, 215 ; State v. Schneider, 1946 OK 103 , 197 Okla. 57 , 168 P.2d 288, 291-92 .
. An agency's longstanding construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statule will not be disturbed without cogent reason. Schulte Oil Co., Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 1994 OK 103 , 882 P.2d 65, 68 ; Oral Roberts University v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1985 OK 97 , 714 P.2d 1013, 1015 .
. Coleman v. Sequoyah County Election Bd., 1988 OK 96 , 762 P.2d 935, 936 ; Wood v. Lydick, 1974 OK 75 , 523 P.2d 1082, 1084 ; Hines v. Winters, 1957 OK 334 , 320 P.2d 1114, 1117 .
. The terms of Art. 2 § 4, Ok. Const., provide:
No power, civil or military, shall ever interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of sullrage by those entitled to such right.
(emphasis added).
The pertinent terms of Art. 3 § 5, OKl. Const., are:
"All elections shall be free and equal. No power, civil or military, shall ever interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage. ..."
(emphasis added).
This principle is often expressed as the people's right to "free and equal" elections. The phrase means that one who is entitled by the State's written law to file for office must receive the government's recognition as a legally qualified candidate. Simpson v. Dixon, 1993 OK 71, ¶ 15 , 853 P.2d 176, 183-84 ; McCarthy v. Slater, 1976 OK 100 , 553 P.2d 489, 490 ; Sparks v. State Election Board, 1964 OK 114 , 392 P.2d 711 , 712 syl. 1; see also Jackson v. Maley, 1991 OK 7, ¶ 8 , 806 P.2d 610, 623-24 (Opala, C.J., dissenting); Asher v. Arnett, 280 Ky. 347 , 132 S.W.2d 772, 715-776 (App.1939).
. Freeman v. State Election Board, 1998 OK 107, ¶ 9 , 969 P.2d 982, 985 ; Burns v. Slater, 1974 OK 139, ¶ 8 , 559 P.2d 428, 429 .