stating that, a petition for involuntary termination of a parent’s parental rights filed by another natural parent is -7- J-A22015-22 potentially moot when it cannot be effectuated due to the absence of an anticipated adoption of the child
How later courts described this case
- stating that, a petition for involuntary termination of a parent’s parental rights filed by another natural parent is -7- J-A22015-22 potentially moot when it cannot be effectuated due to the absence of an anticipated adoption of the child
- holding that the trial court erred in - 11 - J-A13044-18 terminating a mother’s parental rights under subsection 2511(a)(1
- stating court should consider, and not merely accept on its face, averment of intent to adopt, to ascertain that termination is sought as - 16 - J-E02009-15 aid to adoption and formation of new parent-child relationship
- reversing involuntary termination of mother’s parental rights, where termination decree was entered to make way for stepmother’s adoption of child, in light - 15 - J-E02009-15 of new evidence that stepmother no longer wanted to adopt child
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as a remand for a determination of mootness appears to me to be a pointless gesture. We have everything we need to answer the very simple question presented for our review, which the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court (OAJC) implicitly recognizes by virtue of its very detailed opinion. With this foundation in place, we very easily and succinctly could decide the merits of this case.
I would hold the order terminating Mother’s parental rights was not supported by competent evidence and should be reversed — the record and the OAJC’s abbreviated analysis compel this result. If that is true, a remand accomplishes nothing. The parties would be returned to the exact position they were in before the trial court’s ruling; Mother’s right would be intact.
*242 If the trial court finds the impetus for the petition to terminate rights is no longer in place, then the most that court can do on remand is not terminate Mother’s rights, a result we can accomplish now. Conversely, if the trial court finds termination is still in play, the case will simply be returned to us to rule on the issue already before us, unenhanced by additional evidence. Remand accomplishes nothing.
Remand consumes significant judicial resources and the parties’ time by essentially asking if we should still decide the case. And this is not a straightforward remand, as a judge from another judicial district is ordered to decide the matter, with all the logistical limitations and additional delays inherent in such an order. Having gone three-quarters of the way to deciding this case on the merits, and with a result on the merits apparent from the analysis, a retreat because of a fear of mootness does everyone more harm than good, and without an availing difference from the result we can, and should, reach now.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.