stating that, a petition for involuntary termination of a parent’s parental rights filed by another natural parent is -7- J-A22015-22 potentially moot when it cannot be effectuated due to the absence of an anticipated adoption of the child
How later courts described this case
- stating that, a petition for involuntary termination of a parent’s parental rights filed by another natural parent is -7- J-A22015-22 potentially moot when it cannot be effectuated due to the absence of an anticipated adoption of the child
- holding that the trial court erred in - 11 - J-A13044-18 terminating a mother’s parental rights under subsection 2511(a)(1
- stating court should consider, and not merely accept on its face, averment of intent to adopt, to ascertain that termination is sought as - 16 - J-E02009-15 aid to adoption and formation of new parent-child relationship
- reversing involuntary termination of mother’s parental rights, where termination decree was entered to make way for stepmother’s adoption of child, in light - 15 - J-E02009-15 of new evidence that stepmother no longer wanted to adopt child
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice TODD,
concurring and dissenting.
This Court has designated the instant case as a “fast-track” appeal, reflecting this Court’s philosophy that matters involving children should be resolved as expeditiously as possible and without undue delay. Here, the record suggests that Mother has not seen L.J.B. in almost five years, and a remand for further proceedings, as proposed by the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court (“OAJC”), undoubtedly will prolong even further the uncertainty which has plagued both Mother and L.J.B. Accordingly, while I agree with the OAJC that, where there is evidence to suggest that an action has become moot, the preferred approach generally is to resolve that question by remand or otherwise before addressing the merits, in my view, a remand is inappropriate in the instant case.
*241 Based on my exhaustive review of the record in the instant case, I join the views of Justice Orie Melvin and Justice Eakin, as set forth in their respective Dissenting Opinions, that there is substantial and sufficient evidence to support Mother’s claim that her efforts to maintain contact with L.J.B. were continually frustrated by Father. Moreover, I agree with Justice Orie Melvin that the Superior Court erred in failing to properly consider such evidence, focusing solely on Mother’s failure to seek court intervention, rather than the totality of the circumstances, as required. Given this record, and in light of our self-imposed charge to resolve matters involving children expeditiously, I see no reason to further delay resolution of this matter by remanding to the trial court for determination of mootness, and would simply reverse the order of the Superior Court.
I do, however, join in the OAJC’s determination that, based on the peculiar facts and procedural history of this matter, any further proceedings with regard to L.J.B. should be presided over by a new jurist from a different judicial district, as appointed by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts.