Travis v. County of Santa Cruz

BROWN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Steven Travis’s action challenging the validity of the conditions imposed by the County of Santa Cruz (hereafter County) on his development permit is timely and that Travis can raise a facial attack on the ordinance’s validity under Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E). However, although the majority disclaims any such intent, its treatment of the constitutional claims effectively puts an “expiration date” on fundamental guarantees. (See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606 [ 150 L.Ed.2d 592 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 ].) From that portion of the analysis, I dissent.

Plaintiffs contend that the passage of the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code, §§ 1954.50-1954.535) has preempted the ordinance and that enforcement of the ordinance works a taking of their property without compensation. Admittedly, the interaction of the public interest and private constitutional protections raises complex questions, which are not easily *777 resolved. But, when considering constitutional implications, it is important for courts to think as carefully and to articulate governing principles as precisely as possible. The majority concludes an action seeking removal of permit conditions is timely if brought within 90 days of the final decision imposing the conditions. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 762.) Challenges based on broader claims of invalidity, i.e., preemption or unconstitutionality, are subject to the three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338 and are thereafter permanently barred. The majority never explains, however, what policy imperative or maxim of constitutional interpretation compels the latter result.

The fundamental purpose served by statutes of limitations—even the stringent limitations of validation actions—is to prevent stale claims. (Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 787 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 392 , 598 P.2d 45 ].) They thus provide repose to individuals subject to legal actions or criminal prosecution. Statutes of limitations “ ‘are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’ ” (Wood v. Filing Corp. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 353, 362 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 696 , 572 P.2d 755 ].) “Just determinations of fact cannot be made when, because of the passage of time, the memories of witnesses have faded or evidence is lost.” (Wilson v. Garcia (1985) 471 U.S. 261, 271 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 254 , 105 S.Ct. 1938 ], italics added.) Similarly, litigants may not “ ‘attack ancient administrative determinations on the ground they constitute a necessary foundation for current administrative action’ ” because it would “ ‘inject unacceptable uncertainty’ ” into administrative decision making and “ ‘emasculate the purposes of the statute of limitations.’ ” (Traverso v. Department of Transportation (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1148 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 ], quoting Miller v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1376-1377 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 915 ].)

In similar respects, statutes of limitations allow public entities to implement new enactments without concern for contingent liabilities that may not become manifest for many years. This latter concern justified the restrictions this court imposed in Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 , 876 P.2d 1043 ]: “The purpose of statutes and rules which require that attacks on land-use decisions be brought by petitions for administrative mandamus, and create relatively short limitation periods for those actions, and actions which challenge the validity of land-use statutes, regulations, and/or decisions, is to permit and promote sound fiscal planning by state and local governmental entities.” (Id. at p. 27.)

*778 Although the assertion of a constitutional right is subject to reasonable statutes of limitations (Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 13 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ]; Rand v. Bossen (1945) 27 Cal.2d 61, 65 [ 162 P.2d 457 ]), we have declared this principle in the context of vindication of personal claims or failure to challenge revenue measures. The rationale for imposing a limitations period breaks down, however, where the plaintiff seeks a declaration of constitutional invalidity or preemption rather than monetary damages or similar remedies. The desire to avoid stale claims dependent on ancient facts or to minimize potential fiscal disruption is not implicated in an action merely to conform an enactment to controlling authority.

The discussion in Palazzolo suggests a way to harmonize the countervailing interests at issue here. In rejecting the state’s argument that a property owner who takes title to land after enactment of a regulation cannot assert a takings claim, the high court observed: “Just as a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the value of land without effecting a taking because it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned, other enactments are unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or title. Were we to accept the State’s rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 627 , italics added.)

Justice Stevens’s concurring and dissenting opinion also endorsed the principle that future generations have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land. “If a regulating body fails to adhere to its procedural or substantive obligations in developing land-use restrictions, anyone adversely impacted by the restrictions may challenge their validity in an injunctive action. If the application of such restriction to a property owner would cause her a ‘direct and substantial injury,’ [citation], I have no doubt that she has standing to challenge the restriction’s validity whether she acquired title to the property before or after the regulation was adopted.” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, supra, 533 U.S. 606, 638 (cone. & dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) However, he stopped short of saying that a succeeding owner may obtain compensation for a taking of property from her predecessor in interest. (Ibid.)

*779 The resolution of this case does not require us to address the merits of either claim. We are asked simply to decide whether a public entity’s action may be insulated from review by the running of the statute of limitations. The zoning restriction here becomes a permanent limitation in the landowner’s deed and will thus restrict subsequent purchasers. Considering the purpose of any limitations period, I see no reason to bar subsequent purchasers from ever challenging this ordinance simply because they have no need to obtain a permit. Moreover, even current owners who did not challenge a permit condition when it was imposed, may have standing to seek pure declaratory relief if the status quo is altered by preemption or subsequent interpretation.