noting that, by alleging "ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial and direct appeal of these cases, the defendant waived the benefits of both the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege, but only with respect to matters relevant to his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel" (second emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- noting that, by alleging "ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial and direct appeal of these cases, the defendant waived the benefits of both the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege, but only with respect to matters relevant to his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel" (second emphasis added)
- finding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the postconviction proceeding waived the attorney-client privilege as to matters relevant to his allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
- noting th~t, by alleging "ineffective ~i_stai
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SHAW, Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the result.
Although I agree with most of the analysis in Part I of the main opinion, I note that, in my view, this Court’s holding is dictated by State v. Click, 768 So.2d 417, 421 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), in which we held *81 that “[a] postconviction petitioner who raises a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel ‘waives the attorney-client privilege as to matters reasonably related to the claim of inadequate representation.’ ” In Click , this Court, quoting Charles W. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, § 394.01(3) (5th ed.1996), went on to state:
“ ‘If the client charges the attorney with misconduct, the privilege is lifted insofar as is necessary to enable the attorney to combat the charge. This would necessarily mean that the client could not base a lawsuit against the attorney upon the negligence of the attorney’s advice and then object when the attorney attempts to testify as to the attorney’s own version of what was said. This would open the door, of course, to only so much of the privileged matter that is relevant and necessary to the attorney’s defense.” ’
768 So.2d at 422 . Therefore, I concur in the result as to part I.
I concur as to Part II.
WISE, J., concurs.