“This requirement of an investigation [imposed by section 832.5], and the resulting investigation itself, can have substantial effects. Public resources are required to investigate these complaints, resources that could otherwise be used for other matters . . . .”
How later courts described this case
- “This requirement of an investigation [imposed by section 832.5], and the resulting investigation itself, can have substantial effects. Public resources are required to investigate these complaints, resources that could otherwise be used for other matters . . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*513 WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority that Penal Code section 148.6 (section 148.6) is constitutional because it criminalizes only knowingly false complaints against peace officers, and any content discrimination it embodies by not covering complaints against other public officials is, in light of the substantial secondary effects of a complaint against a peace officer, justifiable under R. A. V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 [ 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 ] (R.A.V.) “ ‘without reference to the content of the . . . speech’ ” (id. at p. 389 [ 112 S.Ct. at p. 2546 ]). (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 508-509 [noting cost to public of mandatory investigation of police misconduct complaints].) Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of reversal and in this aspect of the majority’s reasoning. I disagree, however, that section 148.6 also falls within R.A. V. ’s “special force” exception for content discrimination based on “the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable” (R.A.V., supra, at p. 388 [ 112 S.Ct. at p. 2545 ]) or its catchall exception, applicable where “there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot” (id. at p. 390 [ 112 S.Ct. at p. 2547 ]). (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 508-509.)
As the majority itself points out, the reason that the class of speech at issue—knowingly false statements of fact—is proscribable (as defamation) is that it has “ ‘no constitutional value’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 504, quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 340 [ 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 ]); that is, such speech may injure personal reputations without making any positive contribution to the democratic process. This reason, the majority asserts, “has ‘special force’ [citation] when applied to false accusations against peace officers.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 508.) But section 148.6 does not target speech that is especially worthless or especially injurious to reputation. Put another way, the majority identifies nothing about false speech affecting peace officers that distinguishes it from false speech affecting other governmental officials with respect to the grounds on which defamation is proscribable in the first place. Accordingly, R.A. V. ’s “special force” exception does not apply. (See R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 388 [ 112 S.Ct. at p. 2546 ].)
As to the catchall exception, the majority sees here “no realistic possibility of official suppression of ideas” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 509), but I disagree. Section 148.6 “gives protection to peace officers that the Legislature has not given to others” who work in public service. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 503.) Section 148.6 also is unique in its mandate that the possibility of criminal sanctions for knowingly false complaints be prominently held up before prospective complainants at a critical juncture. In many police misconduct situations, it inevitably will come down to the word of the citizen against the word of the police officer or officers, in which case law enforcement *514 authorities will conduct an investigation to determine who is telling the truth. If authorities for any reason disbelieve the citizen, the citizen (whether guilty or innocent) may then under section 148.6 face both criminal prosecution and the burden and expense of retaining a defense attorney. Prospective complainants cannot help but be aware of these realities when deciding whether to go forward with their complaints by signing the statute’s required admonition. Realistically, some complainants are likely to choose not to go forward—even when they have legitimate complaints.
In light of the foregoing, and as we need not, in order to find section 148.6 constitutional, rely on R.A.V’s “special force” or catchall exceptions from the First Amendment’s general ban on content discrimination, I do not rely on them. Instead, I rest my concurrence on the exception for content discrimination justifiable “ ‘without reference to the content of the . . . speech.’ ” (R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 389 [ 112 S.Ct. at p. 2546 ].)
Moreno, J., concurred.