stating that it was “immaterial whether the agreement was explained to” the plaintiff because “[a]s a competent and literate adult, he [wa]s responsible for the contracts that he ma[de]”
How later courts described this case
- stating that it was “immaterial whether the agreement was explained to” the plaintiff because “[a]s a competent and literate adult, he [wa]s responsible for the contracts that he ma[de]”
- concluding that, an arbitrator decides issues of substantive arbitrability when the arbitration provision incorporated. the same AAA- rule as in the present case
- reversing a judgment denying a motion to compel arbitration by a supervisor who had allegedly assaulted the plaintiff because the complaint described the supervisor as “acting in the line and scope of his employment”
- noting that an arbitration agreement incorporating the AAA rules clearly and unmistakably delegates arbitrability questions to the arbitrator
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WOODALL, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion, but I write to clarify that Kenneth Stringfellow, in both the trial court and this Court, has adequately argued that Ex parte Rush, 730 So.2d 1175 (Ala.1999), supports his claim that his status as an employee of Joe Hudson Collision Center allows him to enforce the arbitration agreement. As noted in the main opinion, Dymond’s objections to the motions to compel arbitration did not include any challenge to Stringfellow’s standing to enforce the arbitration agreement, and Dymond has filed no brief in this Court. Therefore, I question whether it is necessary for this Court to address the issue of Stringfellow’s standing to enforce that agreement. However, I certainly agree that, under the facts of this case, he had standing to do so.
COBB, C.J., and LYONS, J., concur.