People v. Randle

BAXTER, J.,

Concurring.—I concur in the opinion of the court, but write separately to clarify the limited role that In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 872 P.2d 574 ] (Christian S.) plays in this case. In particular, I disagree with Justice Brown that Christian S. compels the outcome here. (See conc. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 1008.)

Here there was evidence showing that the aggression of Brian Robinson exceeded any justifiable response to the criminal conduct defendant and his cousin Byron W. initiated, and that Robinson acted to physically punish Byron when Byron was helpless and posed no threat to anyone. Under these circumstances, Christian S. does not categorically bar defendant from invoking the doctrine of imperfect defense of others. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1001-1003.) But neither does Christian S. logically compel the doctrine’s availability in this case, as Justice Brown contends in her concurring opinion.

In Christian S., an opinion I authored, we addressed the question whether the Legislature abrogated the doctrine of imperfect self-defense in 1981 by amending the Penal Code to eliminate the diminished capacity defense. 1 We found the Legislature did not do so, and concluded the doctrine remained intact. As part of a general discussion of the doctrine’s limitations, we noted *1007 the “well-established” rule that “the ordinary self-defense doctrine . . . may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified. [Citations.]” (Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1.) After concluding that, “a fortiori, ... the imperfect self-defense doctrine cannot be invoked in such circumstances,” we gave one clear example of its limited availability: “[T]he imperfect self-defense doctrine would not permit a fleeing felon who shoots a pursuing police officer to escape a murder conviction even if the felon killed his pursuer with an actual belief in the need for self-defense.” (Ibid.) Although we also cautioned the imperfect self-defense doctrine was a narrow one, requiring a defendant’s actual fear of an imminent harm (id. at p. 783), we had no need and made no effort to otherwise define the parameters of the doctrine.

Unlike the instant case, Christian S. did not involve any criminal conduct initiated by the defendant. Neither did it concern any claim of perfect or imperfect defense of others. Moreover, the decision did not purport to set forth all the circumstances under which a defendant may or may not assert the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. In sum, Christian S. did not recognize, or refuse to recognize, the imperfect defense of others doctrine, and did not address possible restrictions to the imperfect self-defense doctrine other than to note the one obvious example above. Accordingly, that decision does not compel the result here. (See People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 17 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348 , 939 P.2d 748 ] [referencing the familiar rule that language in an opinion is to be understood in light of the facts and the issue then before the court].)

That said, I concur in the court’s conclusion that nothing we said in Christian S. prohibits defendant here from invoking the imperfect defense of others doctrine. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1001-1003.) Although defendant’s initial criminal conduct in brandishing and shooting a firearm may well have provoked anger and fear in Robinson, there appears substantial evidence that Robinson exceeded any justifiable response when, after catching up to and physically attacking Byron the first time, Robinson returned to the obviously helpless Byron a second time to resume beating him.

Although I believe our holding is consistent with the restrictions thus far recognized for the analogous doctrine of imperfect self-defense, I join Justice Brown in her call for the Legislature to provide clear definitions of malice, and to reexamine the issues of whether and to what extent a defendant may invoke the doctrines of imperfect self-defense and imperfect defense of others. (See conc. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 1010; People v. Wright (2005) 35 Cal.4th 964, 985-986 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 708 , 111 P.3d 973 ] (conc. opn. of Brown, J.).) To the extent the *1008 doctrines are legislatively approved in some form, it would be particularly beneficial to have legislative guidance regarding: (1) the type and nature of criminal conduct, whether violent or otherwise, that might preclude a defendant from invoking one or both doctrines; and (2) considerations for determining the duration that a defendant’s criminal conduct bars either doctrine’s availability.

In Christian S., the defendant, a minor, sought review of a judgment making him a ward of the juvenile court after sustaining a petition charging him with second degree murder. The evidence showed that the victim was a so-called skinhead and a possible gang member, and that the defendant began carrying a handgun after the victim’s friends had physically and verbally harassed and threatened the defendant for about a year. The victim had blamed the defendant for damaging his truck, and one day he chased the defendant while repeatedly threatening “ ‘to get him’ ” and challenging him to fire his weapon. (Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 772 .) The victim halted his advance each time the defendant pointed his gun at him. Finally, after some additional taunting by the victim, the defendant shot and killed him. (Ibid.) Upon finding that the imperfect self-defense doctrine had not been statutorily abrogated, we remanded the matter for further proceedings because the record was ambiguous whether the trial court found the defendant lacked an actual belief in the need for self-defense, or whether the court mistakenly believed the defense was not viable. (Id. at pp. 783-784.)