noting that the court maintains its “longstanding practice” of refusing to engage in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal
How later courts described this case
- noting that the court maintains its “longstanding practice” of refusing to engage in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal
- “[W]e do not believe that comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal is constitutionally compelled.”
- “We reiterate what we ... stated in Box: ... ‘strong likelihood’ and ‘reasonable inference’ state the same standard.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WERDEGAR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in parts I., II.A. and II.C. of the majority opinion. With respect to the proper standard of proof for establishing a prima facie showing under People v. Wheeler (1978) *1329 22 Cal.3d 258 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ] and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ], I dissent and join part II. of Justice Kennard’s dissenting opinion.