holding that, although the trial court did not fully inform the defendant of all three Boykin rights, the record established that the defendant was apprised of these rights when he completed a waiver-of-rights form and the trial court entered into a colloquy to ensure that the defendant had read the form with a full understanding, and the defendant acknowledged that he had reviewed the form with his attorney
How later courts described this case
- holding that, although the trial court did not fully inform the defendant of all three Boykin rights, the record established that the defendant was apprised of these rights when he completed a waiver-of-rights form and the trial court entered into a colloquy to ensure that the defendant had read the form with a full understanding, and the defendant acknowledged that he had reviewed the form with his attorney
- holding that waiver- of-rights form adequately conveyed core principles of “the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” through use of other wording
- together with testimony and lawyer certification that accused had read and understood plea form, form was sufficient to establish that accused was aware of his essential rights
- waiver-of-rights form is “some affirmative evidence that either the trial court or trial counsel entered into a colloquy with defendant” and explained his constitutional rights
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NAHMIAS, Justice,
concurring.
The Court correctly applies our Boykin-based decisions of the past few years to hold that Brown was adequately advised of his “three Boykin rights” and thus that his 1993 guilty plea — which he did not challenge until 2008 — was freely and voluntarily entered. I would prefer to reach that result, and it would be easier to do so, using the less formalistic analysis that I believe Boykin actually requires and that our older, but never overruled, cases employed. See Tyner v. State, 289 Ga. 592, 595 (4) ( 714 SE2d 577 ) (2011) (opinion of Nahmias, J., joined by Carley, E J.); Goodman v. Davis, 249 Ga. 11, 14 ( 287 SE2d 26 ) (1982) (“We decline to adopt a rule which would demand that failure to advise an accused of his right against self-incrimination invalidates a guilty plea in a case where the record reflects that the central considerations of Boykin have otherwise been met.”). However, because the Court’s opinion reaches the right result and does no further harm to our Boykin case law, I can join the opinion in full.