holding that the term “unwelcome” applied to all proscribed forms of “sexual harassment” listed in Section 39.03(c) of the Penal Code because that construction made the most sense in the context of the overall statutory scheme
How later courts described this case
- holding that the term “unwelcome” applied to all proscribed forms of “sexual harassment” listed in Section 39.03(c) of the Penal Code because that construction made the most sense in the context of the overall statutory scheme
- indicating that “under the First Amendment, a statute may be subject to a facial challenge even though it may have some legitimate application, but absent the First Amendment, ‘a facial challenge could be mounted successfully only if the statute were vague in all of its applications.’”
- suggesting that “intentional” culpable mental state can sometimes carry an implied “knowing” mental state for certain elements in a statute, depending on the context
- holding that a person who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRICE, J.,
delivered a concurring opinion.
I join the opinion of the majority and write separately in response to the conflicting views of what culpable mental state is required regarding the “unwelcomeness” of the conduct. Ante at 685 n. 7; post at 692 (Womack, J., concurring).
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the incident which incited this legislation appears unlikely, to fall within the definition of sexual harassment that requires the actor to intend the unwelcomeness of the conduct. As the majority explains, that case involved a judge telling a woman he would take care of her ticket in exchange for oral sex. When asked by the woman if she could do anything else, such as maintenance work around the courthouse, the judge responded “No, I have something else in mind for you.” This colloquy could easily be interpreted as a sexual predator continuing his unwelcome advances, not only knowing they were unwelcome, but intending them to be unwelcome as a further display of his power and authority over the woman. Thus, I believe the case which incited this legislation, as well as the instant case, could be considered sexual harassment under either the majority’s interpretation or Judge Wom-ack’s concurring opinion.
With these comments, I join the opinion of the Court.