holding that Tex. Code Crim.P. Ann. art. 37.07, sec. 4(a) (Vernon Supp.1988) (“the parole statute”), requiring that the trial court instruct the jury on the Texas parole laws, is unconstitutional
How later courts described this case
- holding that Tex. Code Crim.P. Ann. art. 37.07, sec. 4(a) (Vernon Supp.1988) (“the parole statute”), requiring that the trial court instruct the jury on the Texas parole laws, is unconstitutional
- presuming the jury generally follows the trial court's instruction unless appellant presents evidence to rebut presumption
- holding that predecessor statute violated separation of powers and due course of law
- declaring § 4(a) of article 37.07 unconstitutional, on the basis that it violated separation of powers and due course of law clauses
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Karenev v. State, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 961 (2009)
752 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), abrogated by, Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428
Limited by Shearer v. State, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 1355 (1989)
However, although we agree that the additional instruction discussed in Rose, supra, and Olivarez, supra, is a significant factor in the application of TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b)(2), we disapprove of any suggestion that harmless error is not possible in the absence of such an additional instruction.
The opinion
ONION, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached, but clearly not in most of the reasoning used in the opinion on the court’s own motion for rehearing. The error here is charge error, not some other kind of error.