stating that the important question in determining whether a defendant’s substantial rights were prejudiced is whether a defendant had notice adequate to prepare his defense.
How later courts described this case
- stating that the important question in determining whether a defendant’s substantial rights were prejudiced is whether a defendant had notice adequate to prepare his defense.
- abolishing the concept of automatic reversal in voir dire questioning error
- erroneous denial of a motion to quash is not reversible error absent harm to the accused
- requiring an appellant to show prejudice to substantial rights from the lack of notice in an indictment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Ponder v. State, 1988 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 13 (1988)
He states that Adams, supra, is inapplicable to this case since that decision concerned a notice defect in the indictment and not misjoinder.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Our Brother Teague denounces the quartet of Judges who have adhered to Craven v. State, 613 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), as if we were the “Gang of Four” reincarnated.
Impaired by fervor of the moment generated in the doing, he loses sight of certain facts: the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals did make a facial examination of the information and did find that the motion to quash had merit. Adams v. State, 669 S.W.2d 339, 341-342 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984); the opinion of this Court in this cause iterates same rules for testing sufficiency of notice from the perspective of the accused, even citing same authorities, and approves that finding by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals.
To that extent, at least, both opinions deserve from Judge Teague the same tribute he pays to Jeffers v. State, 646 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). And from a correct reading of the concurring opinion in Smith v. State. 658 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983), so does the “Gang of Four.” 1
The aspect of Craven that upsets Judge Teague is capsuled in the following statement:
“Reviewing an adverse ruling of a trial court on a pretrial motion to quash, or an exception, on account of a claimed defect in the form of allegations in an information, this Court has been directed [by Article 21.19, Y.A.C.C.P.] not to reverse a conviction simply because the ruling is erroneous [if the defect does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant].”
*905 Craven, supra, at 490 . 2 He would have the Court continue to uphold the decision on rehearing in Jeffers, supra, at 188-189 , and thereby also reject reliance by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals on Craven . Instead, the Court overrules that part of Jef-fers and restores the essence of Craven .
With its opinion today the Court makes moot my contention that the Jeffers majority misapprehended the gravamen of Craven , see note 7 and accompanying text at 190. From my point of view, however, another matter still remains to be settled: Since both Craven and Jeffers are positioned on a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea bargain agreement that was honored, whether rationale of the former is applicable when trial is by jury. Compare Smith v. State, supra, which found error in overruling a “notice” motion to quash, reversed the judgment and ordered dismissal of indictments; but, as pointed out ante, the majority did not address the Jeffers decision on rehearing, and perforce gained votes of the “Gang of Four.”
Article 21.19, supra, embraces not only defects of form in a charging instrument but also “trial, judgment or other proceedings thereon.” Since it is a progeny of the “Common Sense Indictment Act,” Acts 1881, Ch. 57, p. 60, § 17, p. 63, generally designed to prevent reversals for defects in indictments, by retaining it the Legislature must have intended the same rule of review to apply to a trial by jury and a trial before a court, as well as a trial upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Though policy considerations identified in Craven for applying it to the latter may be more compelling, I am persuaded they also motivated the Legislature to direct the rule be applied uniformly.
Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court.
. “Today a majority applies the holding in the panel Jeffers opinion on original submission to find the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to quash. The rationale of the Jeffers en banc opinion on motion for rehearing is not discussed or mentioned by the majority. Presumably it is not being implicated. Accordingly, 1 concur in the judgment of the Court.”
*905 All emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise indicated.
. Since there was no transcription of notes of court reporter taken at pretrial proceeding or at trial and "the record before us will not shed any light on the ultimate issue of prejudice to substantial rights of appellant, though there be error in denying the motion to quash,” the Craven panel overruled appellant’s ground of error.