there was not a scintilla of evidence to support appellant’s contention that his race was discriminated against because a number of the panel from which his jury was drawn had been required to serve through delayed jury service
How later courts described this case
- there was not a scintilla of evidence to support appellant’s contention that his race was discriminated against because a number of the panel from which his jury was drawn had been required to serve through delayed jury service
- no abuse of discretion to permit same attorney in Ex Parte Powers, supra, to participate as "special prosecutor" with consent of same district attorney; need not take constitutional oath of office as prerequisite to appearing in case
- applying rule in criminal context
- private attorney employed by victim’s family to prosecute case
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Judge.
*270 This Court has again examined this record with care at the insistence of appellant’s earnest counsel.
We remain convinced that under the circumstances here presented an accused may not wait until after the trial, the results of which are distasteful to him, and then complain of an irregularity in the manner of the selection of the jury. We observe however that the action of the District Courts in Bexar County in complying with the provisions of Art. 2120, Vernon’s Ann.Rev.Civ.St., in a diligent manner so as to see that those persons whose names have been drawn from the jury wheel do in fact serve as jurors at another date if such juror is unavailable for service when first notified, is to be commended.
This record reveals that there was not a scintilla of evidence to support appellant’s contention that his race was discriminated against because a number of the panel from which his jury were drawn had been required to serve through delayed jury service. In Gonzales v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 488 , 278 S.W.2d 167 , we said “A showing of the racial composition of a particular jury does not by itself, standing alone, show racial discrimination.”
We also decline to accept his contention that this required delayed service creates a screening process whereby persons belonging to certain economic groups are concentrated. We do not view Judge Curry’s testimony as supporting his contention. When taken as a whole together with Judge Brown’s testimony the opposite conclusion is apparent.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
DOUGLAS, J., not participating.