according to the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, Arkansas Code Annotated sections 25-15-201 to -220 (Repl. 2014 & Supp. 2021), it is not the role of the circuit courts or the appellate courts to conduct a de novo review of the record
How later courts described this case
- according to the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, Arkansas Code Annotated sections 25-15-201 to -220 (Repl. 2014 & Supp. 2021), it is not the role of the circuit courts or the appellate courts to conduct a de novo review of the record
- where Officer Smith admitted he wrote checks to merchants without knowing how much money was in his account at the time, that he received notice of the returned checks, and that he failed to rectify the wrongs suffered by the merchants without judicial intervention, the Commission’s termination of Smith was supported by substantial evidence
- reviewing and upholding the State Police Commission’s decision to terminate a police officer’s employment, where the Commission’s action affirmed the decision of the Director of the Arkansas State Police
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Lavenski R. Smith, Justice, dissenting. I concur in the majority’s holding that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that appellee violated the Arkansas State Police’s Code of Conduct. I applaud the Commission for setting and maintaining high standards of integrity for those given the responsibility and privilege to enforce our state’s laws. However, I cannot agree that the facts or our precedents justify termination of an officer with nineteen years and ten months of unblemished service.
Contrary to appellee’s argument, our review is of the administrative agency decision not the circuit court’s ruling. Our law is well settled, we affirm the agency decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. However, that does not mean we rubber-stamp agency decisions. After this decision, though, it is difficult to imagine a termination we would not affirm.
Termination is a harsh but sometimes necessary punishment for misconduct. It is not warranted here. This case is markedly different from either Partlow v. State Police Commission, 271 Ark. 351 , 609 S.W.2d 23 (1980) or Tuck v. Arkansas State Police Commission, 282 Ark 39 , 665 S.W.2d 276 (1984), where we have previously upheld terminations of state police officers. In both cases the misconduct justifying termination involved overt actions of misuse of state property and authority. Partlow literally stole a confiscated motorcycle. Tuck committed multiple separate violations all involving on-duty activity and demonstrating disregard for department policy including influencing officers under his authority to not properly enforce the law by “fixing” tickets.
In the instant case, officer Smith was negligent in the handling of his personal finances by not ensuring an adequate balance in a checking account into which his bank was depositing installments on his construction loan. Criminal charges were filed but subsequently dismissed. Smith paid the checks and associated fines. It reflected negatively upon him personally and upon the department. But, no state property or power were implicated by his actions. Surely, demotion or suspension would have sufficed to adequately punish the rule violation and send an appropriate message to other officers and the citizens of this state. But to end the long career of an otherwise competent officer on these facts is totally unwarranted and not supported by substantial evidence. I therefore respectfully dissent.