“On the record before us the equitable obligation of these appellants cannot be disputed. . . . The assessment voluntarily made by the large majority of lot owners appears fair and equitable.”
How later courts described this case
- “On the record before us the equitable obligation of these appellants cannot be disputed. . . . The assessment voluntarily made by the large majority of lot owners appears fair and equitable.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring in result.
I agree that the decision of the trial court should be sustained on the basis of general equitable principles.
I write because the principal opinion unnecessarily and unwisely pronounces the consent decrees “void.” This broad language might dissuade a court from making an equitable adjustment in a future sitúa-' tion which we cannot precisely foresee, in the manner of Weatherby Lake Improvement Company v. Sherman, 611 S.W.2d 326 (Mo.App.1980), which is cited with apparent approval.
The authorities cited in the principal opinion are not at all appropriate. In Lake Wauwanoka, Inc. v. Spain, 622 S.W.2d 309 (Mo.App.1981), Judge Satz carefully distinguished between “failure to state a claim” and “want of jurisdiction over the subject matter” in an opinion holding that the trial court “did possess subject matter jurisdiction.” His opinion affirmed the dismissal of the action because “appellants’ petitions failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” The case before him involved the dismissal of the plaintiff’s *858 petition. The court properly expressed no opinion as to what the result would have been if there had been a final and unap-pealed judgment, whether in a class action or otherwise.
Rippe v. Sutter, 292 S.W.2d 86 (Mo.1956) bears not the least resemblance to this case. It states only an abstract proposition and is of no help in solving the present problem. The principal opinion demonstrates that people who involve themselves in a venture of the kind described in evidence may sometimes fail to plan and provide for conditions and circumstances which are essential to the success and continuation of the venture. I would avoid sweeping pronouncements about the absence of equitable jurisdiction. The principal opinion refers to “the unique circumstances attending this case.” We speak authoritatively only on the unique circumstances of any case which comes before us, leaving it to future courts to determine the application of our holding to other fact situations.
Because of the unwarranted attempt to expand the scope of the opinion by means of the first paragraph in Part II, my concurrence in affirming the judgment must be in the result only.