The opinion
LUMPKIN, J.;:
Concur in Results.
T1 I concur in the result reached by the Court but I take exception on a couple of issues.
{2 First, I disagree with the Court's handling of the testimony by the forensic investigators/scientists Don Wilson, Collette Callum and Elaine Taylor in Proposition II. Each of these expert witnesses testified to what they observed and based on their experience what they had expected to find in this type of case, but did not. They did not attempt to quantify the evidence found but testified in general as to what they would have expected in a case of this type. This testimony is well within the parameters of 12 0.8.Supp.2002, § 2702, as it was based on their "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education ...". Id. Their opinions boiled down to statements that based on their experience, they would just have expected more of the victim's bodily residue to be under Ballentine's fingernails. The majority finds this testimony improper as these investigators/scientists had not seen a disembowelment case before and they were not experts in "disembowelment forensics". To take such a restricted view is not only to ignore past caselaw from this Court dealing with expert witnesses but also places too much reliance on a label and ultimately deprives the parties of needed expertise. Slaughter v. State, 1997 OK CR 78, ¶¶ 20-21 , 950 P.2d 839, 849 ("[lJlabels can be misleading and might otherwise deprive a party of expertise which is needed to develop *284 the issues in the case"). Each of the experts had experience in investigating homicides where a potential defendant was tested for victim residue under the fingernails and could appropriately draw on that experience to give the general opinion they voiced at trial. Further, I cannot join in the majority's unsupported reference to the field of expertise allegedly known as "disembowelment forensics".
13 I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that "... much of Wilson's 'expert' testimony was based not on 'specialized knowledge' or experience, but rather on logic and common sense." at 279. The average person has no perspective on what type of evidence can be extracted from a person suspected of committing a homicide, or how much. It is the expert's "specialized knowledge" upon which they draw to apply the "logic and common sense" in the situation at issue. I find no error in the testimony of Wilson, Callum or Taylor as it was well within their "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education ..." to express a generalized opinion that they would have expected to find more of the victim's residue under Bal-lentine's fingernails.
T4 Further, I disagree with the Court's after-the-fact statement, "this Court finds that the State overestimated this task [Le. proving Ballentine innocent] and 'overworked' this case in this regard." at 288. As any lawyer who has tried criminal cases to a jury knows, you can never take for granted how a jury will respond to evidence. This is especially true in a case where the State not only had to prove Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but also prove Ballentine innocent to combat Appellant's defense. I cannot join in a statement that fails to recognize, much less acknowledge, the thoroughness with which the State presented this case to the jury. Usually, when we observe this level of competence in trial counsel, we compliment the effort, not disparage it. Presenting a cold case to a trier of fact is always a challenge for prosecutors due to the passage of time. To their credit, the victim, Audrey Harris, was not forgotten and the perpetrator of this vile act has been held accountable for his acts.
1 5 With the above exceptions, I join in the affirming of the judgment and sentences in this case.