holding that a trial court has no duty to sua sponte charge the jury on unrequested defensive issues raised by the evidence, but if the trial court on its own does instruct the jury on an issue then it signals that the defense was “the law applicable to the case.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a trial court has no duty to sua sponte charge the jury on unrequested defensive issues raised by the evidence, but if the trial court on its own does instruct the jury on an issue then it signals that the defense was “the law applicable to the case.”
- recognizing that Doyle was pre-Almanza case that overemphasized importance of procedurally perfect jury charge and application paragraph in particular
- applying Malik and finding that the omission of self-defense in the application paragraph of the jury charge, even though it was adequately defined in the jury charge, was a technical violation of a state law rule, which did not affect a constitutional sufficiency of the evidence review
- observing that the court of appeals “properly concluded that the failure to apply the law of self-defense to the facts of the case and to instruct the jury to acquit if they held a reasonable doubt on self-defense was error”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*418 BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
The fundamental requirement of any judge is impartiality which results in decisions based upon the law and the facts without regard to which side ultimately prevails. Impartiality is sorely lacking in this case.
To use a sports metaphor, the State fumbled the ball when it filed an indecipherable petition and brief with this Court. See post at 418 (Meyers, J., dissenting). But rather than ordering rebriefing, the majority removes their robes, dons the uniforms of the State, picks up the fumbled ball and articulates an argument for the State. The majority then returns to its referee position and declares their argument a winner. Such result oriented, judicial activism is truly unforgivable.
Just three months ago, the same majority dismissed as “inadequately briefed,” sixty-four points of error brought by a defendant condemned to death. Mosley v. State, — S.W.2d-, 1998 WL 349513 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998). I dissented, believing that if the defendant had, in fact, failed to “... acquaint the court with the issues in [his] ease and to present argument that will enable the court to decide the case,” as required by Tex. R.App. P. 38.9, the majority should order rebriefing. Today, without any explanation, the majority makes a 180 degree turn and creates out of whole cloth a “winning” argument for the State. The only commonality between the instant case and Mosley is who prevails, the State.
Such open, obvious and rank bias in favor of one party over the other is shameful. Litigants may no longer come to this Court assured that their issues will be resolved in a fair and impartial manner. Instead, they must come knowing a majority of this Court harbors such a bias in favor of the State that it will do whatever it takes to ensure the State prevails.
Accordingly, I dissent.
OVERSTREET, J., joins.