stating that “[i]t is well settled in the law of torts that even though one has probable cause to initiate criminal charges, there can be liability for the malicious continuation of a criminal proceeding”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[i]t is well settled in the law of torts that even though one has probable cause to initiate criminal charges, there can be liability for the malicious continuation of a criminal proceeding”
- stating that “the gravamen[3] of an action, rather than its designation as an action for tort or contract, determines the applicable statute of limitations”
- “A more serious question arises, however, as to the „continuation‟ of the prosecution after it became known that there had been some sort of misunderstanding or „bank error‟ . . . .”
- “Without evidence as to some specific publication of libelous or slanderous material, and the content of that material, there is no predicate in the record for any separate award against Kroger for libel or slander.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BROCK, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the opinion of the Court respecting the action against the bank, but I dissent insofar as the action against Kroger is concerned. It is my view that on the facts as stated in the majority opinion a jury issue was clearly made out on the malicious prosecution count and on the defamation by “checkfax” count. I would therefore revise the judgments of the lower courts dismissing the action against Kroger and remand for a new trial.