The opinion
GALBREATH, Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot concur in the holding of the majority to the effect that the 17 year old defendant, James Mitchell, was not a child at the time of his arrest and unlawful interrogation. I am sustained in my contention by the *503 statutes of this State and the rulings of the United States Supreme Court.
T.C.A. “37-202. Definitions. — When used in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires: (1) 'Child’ means any person eighteen (18) years of age or under.”
It is axiomatic that this Court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. That highest tribunal has ruled that statements elicited from a minor by police while the minor was subject to the jurisdiction of juvenile court may not be admitted against him in a criminal prosecution. As noted in footnote 2 in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 :
“Since the statements were made while petitioner was subject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, they were inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution under the rule of Harling v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 174 , 295 F.2d 161 (1961).”
The rule of Harling v. United States, supra, regarding confessions while a child is still subject to jurisdiction of the juvenile court is summarized as:
“* * * the juvenile proceeding must be insulated from the adult proceeding. This requires that admissions by a juvenile in connection with the non-criminal proceeding be excluded from evidence in the criminal proceeding. We hold this requirement applicable in this case and in all similar cases in the future.”
Harling also in turn bases its rule on an earlier pronouncement from Pee v. United States, 107 U.S.App. *504 D.C. 47, 274 F.2d 556 , which “makes plain that from the moment a child commits an offense In effect he is exempt from the criminal law’ unless and until the Juvenile Court waives its jurisdiction.”
Kent, if we use any measure except the arbitrary one of chronological age, was no child. At 14 he engaged in burglary and other crimes. At 16 he was mature enough to commit forcible rape. Yet the Supreme Court of the United States termed him a child subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court because the particular juvenile act involved by law defined him as such.
While philosophically I might not be wholly in accord, I feel firmly bound by the clearly applicable decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kent and would reverse this case for a trial excluding the illegally obtained admissions against interest.