The opinion
McKAY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion does not rule on the question of the admissibility of the entire death certificate — including the statement of the cause of death, but, instead holds that if it was improper to exclude the cause of death statement on the certificate it was harmless error. Article 4477, Rule 54a, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., provides that when a death certificate is properly certified “it shall be prima facie evidence in all courts and places of the facts therein stated.” The death certificate in this case was properly certified by the Bureau of Vital Statistics, and was signed by Dr. Sheldon Green, M.D., Assistant Medical Examiner.
This court said in Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Shacklett, 412 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.):
“The death certificate complies fully with the provisions of Vernon’s Ann. Civ.St. Article 4477, Rule 54a, and the certificate of the State Registrar was in all things proper. We find the law in this State to be that such certificates are not only admissible in evidence, but are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. In this certificate, the statement is made that the death of the insured was an accident. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Valencia, Tex.Civ.App., 91 S.W.2d 832 ; Southland Life Insurance Co. v. Brown, supra [Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 653 ]; Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Barron, Tex.Civ.App., 269 S.W.2d 467 .”
It was held in Buchanan v. American National Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. Civ.App. — El Paso 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.), that when all the requirements of Art. 4477, *959 Rule 54a, are met a death certificate “is not only admissible in evidence but is prima facie proof of the information therein contained.”
Burrous v. Knotts, 482 S.W.2d 358, 362 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1972, no writ), followed Shacklett and Valencia . See Texas State Highway Department v. Butler, 158 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1942, writ ref’d want of merit) and authorities therein cited.
Here we have a duly authenticated death certificate prepared and signed by a medical doctor who was the Assistant Medical Examiner. Under the statute and the authorities the death certificate was admissible in its entirety (including the statement as to the cause of death). If it had been admitted the jury was not bound to accept it as conclusive proof, but it should have been admitted for the jury’s consideration.
Judge Alexander wrote in Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 121 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Tex. Civ.App. — Waco 1938, writ dism’d):
“. . . The Death certificate shows that the insured committed suicide, and the statute, R.S. 4477, rule 54a, sec. 21, makes properly certified copies of such certificates prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. However, the presumption in favor of the truth of the facts therein recited can be no stronger than the evidence authorizing the making of such statement in the original certificate. The jury was not required to accept the recitations contained in such certificate as conclusive proof of the fact that the insured committed suicide.”
Although Dr. Jachimczyk may have read Dr. Green’s notes or report, and then testified that his opinion was that the cause of death was the same as Dr. Green had stated in the death certificate, the jury was denied the opportunity to see and consider the cause of death statement by Dr. Green on the death certificate. The majority opinion says that the information on the certificate was cumulative. If the entire death certificate should have been admitted, and was not, it seems there should be no presumption as to the effect it may have had on the jury; nor is that conclusive of whether the error was calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.
The one basic issue in this case was the question of the immediate cause of death— whether death was “the direct result of bodily injury through accidental means independently of all other causes, as evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body.” In my view the jury should have been permitted to have before it the admissible evidence on the cause of death in the death certificate.
In my opinion it was reversible error for the trial court to exclude the portion of the deceased’s death certificate wherein it was stated that “arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease” was the immediate cause of death. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause to that court.