Stating that the reviewing court makes its own independent appraisal of the law but defers to the trial courts finding of facts unless they are clearly erroneous
How later courts described this case
- Stating that the reviewing court makes its own independent appraisal of the law but defers to the trial courts finding of facts unless they are clearly erroneous
- explaining that a court may not “exclude additional spectators who did not participate in the disruption based on the conduct of one spectator”
- suggesting that "in some cases, members of the defendant's family or friends may be the only spectators, which would make a 'partial' closure under those circumstances a de facto total closure"
- “[T]he defendant’s family and friends are the people who have the strongest interest or concern in the handling of the defendant’s trial and their attendance perhaps best 19 serves the purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HARRELL, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
Although I agree with Judge Murphy’s dissent insofar as it prefers the “substantial reason” test to the “overriding interest” test, I join the judgment of the Majority opinion because, on this record, the State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate a substantial reason to exclude Norris, if not Myers also, solely by proffer of the prosecutor. Maj. op. at 455, 7 A.3d at 77. Even if the modality of a proffer was a
*466 proper means to place the facts before the trial judge in these circumstances, the substance of the proffer here was inadequate. Maj. op. at 461, 7 A.3d at 80-81. Wise’s post hoc testimony, given after the closure was ordered, should not be considered in this analysis. Maj. op. at 456-57, 7 A.3d at 78.
For these reasons, I join the judgment of the Majority opinion.