The opinion
ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
All parties adversely affected by our respective judgments rendered in these three causes have filed motions for rehearing. After considering the motions, we are not persuaded to change our original judgments; however, we must write further on one matter.
In our cause No. 9341, the Akins’ appeal from the monetary judgment rendered in favor of Mr. Dahl in cause No. 78-11230-L on the docket of the 193rd Judicial District Court, Mr. Dahl presented a cross-point by which he contended that the trial court erred in ordering the $1,450,000 remittitur and that the remitted amount should be restored on appeal. In overruling the cross-point, we held that because Mr. Dahl did not preserve his cross-point contention in the trial court, we did not have jurisdiction to entertain it. In so holding, we erred, for we had overlooked the provision of Rule 328, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which specifies that when the party for whose benefit the remittitur is made shall appeal, then the party remitting shall not be barred from contending in the appellate court that said remittitur should not have been required in whole or in part. Conformable to the rule, we now consider the cross-point.
Mr. Dahl urges that in the light of the whole record, the remittitur ordered is manifestly unjust because the damages he suffered and the effect on his reputation were, in the words of a witness, “irreparable” and “staggering” for one of his stature. We previously reviewed these as well as all other aspects of the damages in considering, discussing, and overruling the Akins’ contentions that the damages, even with the remittitur, are excessive, and those matters, although now reconsidered, will not be repeated here. We do reiterate, however, that we recognized the trial court authorized the total remittitur after determining, by the exercise of its sound judicial judgment and discretion, what amounts would be reasonable compensation for the injuries Mr. Dahl sustained under the evidence. See Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598 , 324 S.W.2d 835, 840 (1959).
The question, then, is whether the trial court abused its discretion in effecting the remittitur. Id. After considering the remittitur in the light of the whole record, we are not able to say that the action of the court in effecting the remittitur was manifestly unjust and, therefore, we perceive no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The cross-point is overruled.
All motions for rehearing are overruled.