denying a writ of prohibition where substance of the petition revealed that the action was essentially an improper appeal from the denial of summary judgment
How later courts described this case
- denying a writ of prohibition where substance of the petition revealed that the action was essentially an improper appeal from the denial of summary judgment
- supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING JANUARY 24, 1994
Petition for Rehearing denied.
Robert L. Brown, Justice. The Wise Company contends on rehearing that the decision in this case denying the writ of prohibition disregards Arkansas authority to the contrary. The corporation further argues that this court has reviewed petitions for writs of prohibition following a denial of summary judgment in the past and should do so in this case. It cites as authority Hill v. Patterson, 313 Ark. 322 , 855 S.W.2d 297 (1993); Fore v. Circuit Court of Izard County, 292 Ark. 13 , 727 S.W.2d 840 (1987).
We repeat our longstanding rule that in prohibition cases we are limited to a consideration of the pleadings, not the proof, in determining whether jurisdiction in the trial court is appropriate. We have made this abundantly clear. See, e.g., Pryor v. Hot Spring County Chancery Court, 303 Ark. 630 , 799 S.W.2d 524 (1990); see also Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-l(a). A trial judge must know from the pleadings, not from evidence subsequently offered, whether a case is appropriately in that court. In Hill v. Patterson, supra, though a denial of summary judgment preceded the prohibition petition, we considered only the allegations in the pleadings in reaching our decision.
Fore v. Circuit Court of Izard, County, supra, does contain dictum to the effect that the petition for writ of prohibition was comparable to an appeal from a summary judgment denial under the circumstances of that case. What is less clear in Fore is whether we limited ourselves to the pleadings in determining whether the matter rested exclusively with the Workers’ Compensation Commission. In the wake of Fore, this court has clearly distanced itself from the overreaching language in that decision. See Lupo v. Lineberger, 313 Ark. 315 , 855 S.W.2d 293 (1993). To the extent that Fore can still be read to sanction writs of prohibition based on information outside of the pleadings, such as affidavits and depositions, it is an aberration in our caselaw, and we overrule it.
The Wise Company requested that we go beyond the pleadings in deciding its petition for writ of prohibition and consider affidavits and depositions filed in connection with the original motion before the trial court and the response. We were invited, in effect, to treat the petition as an appeal from a denial of summary judgment. We emphasize once more that we will not do this. In prohibition matters, we are limited to the pleadings in testing jurisdiction.
The petition for rehearing is denied.