holding the opening of a private road must have a public purpose
How later courts described this case
- holding the opening of a private road must have a public purpose
- recognizing the Act effects a taking by eminent domain
- refusing to uphold condemnation despite incidental public benefit
- “The Constitutions of the United States and Pennsylvania mandate that private property can only be taken to serve a public purpose.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN.
DISSENTING OPINION
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion, as the constitutionality of the Private Road Act (Act) is well settled. 1 *302 Despite the Act’s 173-year history and numerous opportunities to review its constitutionality, this Court has never determined the Act to be unconstitutional, nor has the Legislature indicated a desire to repeal it. Indeed, as Appellee argues, the Legislature seems to have recently bolstered the Act’s purpose of providing relief to a landlocked landowner. After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005), which generated much debate regarding eminent domain and private property rights, the Legislature specifically permitted the use of eminent domain proceedings to create access to a landlocked property. See 26 Pa.C.S. § 204(b)(9) (stating power of eminent domain may be used to take private property where “The property is used ... for any road ... to provide access to a public thoroughfare for a property which would be otherwise inaccessible as the result of the use of eminent domain.... ”). While this is not an eminent domain case, § 204(b)(9) suggests the Legislature clearly intends to ensure landlocked landowners will have a continuing remedy to gain access to a public thoroughfare.
By simply granting a private right of action to an otherwise landlocked landowner, the Act is akin to the common law doctrine of easement by necessity, which has long been used to allow a landlocked landowner to access a public highway over another’s private land when no other relief is available. Although an easement by necessity is typically the result of land which has been severed by its original owner, here, Appellee’s land was severed by the Commonwealth in order to facilitate construction of Interstate 79. Therefore, without the Act, Appellee would have no other relief to gain access to the property, leaving it unproductive — a result which is not in the public’s interest.
Furthermore, I believe the majority’s justification to remand is based, in part, upon irrelevant considerations. The *303 majority fails to explain how a determination of whether the Act was contemplated at the time the Commonwealth possessed the land or “whether Appellee acted with reasonable promptitude” will significantly alter the analysis of this issue to justify additional proceedings and expenditure of resources. Majority op., at 300, 5 A.3d at 258. The parties’ briefs and opinions below sufficiently addressed the arguments necessary for a determination of the issue presented on appeal. Accordingly, I see no need to remand for additional proceedings and respectfully dissent.
Chief Justice CASTILLE and Justice BAER joins this dissenting opinion.
. See In Re: Pocopson Road, 16 Pa. 15 (1851) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Private Road Act); In Re: Dickinson Township Road, 23 Pa.Super. 34 (1903) (rejecting contention that Private Road Act is unconstitutional); In Re: Private Road in East Rockhill Township, Bucks *302 County, Pa., 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 240 , 645 A.2d 313 (1994) (confirming Private Road Act's constitutionality); T.L.C. Services, Inc. v. Kamin 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 547 , 639 A.2d 926 (1994) (confirming Private Road Act's constitutionality).