holding that compelling disclosure of blood donors’ identities was not an impermissible violation of constitutional right to privacy
How later courts described this case
- holding that compelling disclosure of blood donors’ identities was not an impermissible violation of constitutional right to privacy
- holding that the disclosure of blood donors' identities was not an impermissible violation of constitutional right to privacy
- noting that medical records are within constitutionally protected zone of privacy
- declaring identities of blood donors discoverable in civil proceeding
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
FARRIS, Justice.
After our original opinions were handed down in this case, Judge Hughes entered a supplemental order relating to the discovery of the identities of blood donors which reaffirmed the restrictions included in the October 16, 1986 order and placed further restrictions on the parties and their attorneys preventing them from disclosing the identities of the donors or contacting the donors without further order of the court. 1 The supplemental order expresses *685 an intent to allay the fears” contained in the dissenting opinion. In argument on relator’s motion for rehearing, before the court sitting en banc, counsel for relator has expressed relator’s continued objection to any discovery of the identities of blood donors despite the additional restrictions placed upon discovery by the trial court. In argument, the attorney for relator has acknowledged that Judge Hughes has not denied relator any requested restrictions on the use or dissemination of the discovered blood donors’ identities, and that relator would continue its objection to the discovery regardless of any restrictions which the court might impose.
Mandamus issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy by law, and we would act in excess of our writ power if we granted mandamus relief absent these circumstances. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985).
Relator seeks to have us issue our writ compelling the trial court to withdraw its discovery order. The scope of discovery largely rests within the discretion of the trial court. Jordan v. Ct. of App. for Fourth Sup. Jud. Dist., 701 S.W.2d 644, 648-49 (Tex.1985). The supplemented order of the court so restricts the discovery of the blood donors’ identities as to preclude any risk of disclosure of the identities of the blood donors to third persons. The orders of the trial court with regard to the challenged discovery reflect a well reasoned use of the discretion reserved to trial courts on matters of this sort. The relator’s motion for rehearing is overruled. '
. The specific restrictions added by the supplemental order are as follows:
No one, including but not limited to Counsel and the parties, connected with this litigation shall directly nor indirectly divulge or allow *685 to be divulged the identity of any "donors”, any information about such "donors", or any information regarding such "donors” without specific leave and order of this Court.
All information concerning such "donors" shall be kept in a secure place and shall be made available for destruction under the supervision of this Court at the conclusion of this litigation or at such other time as the Court may order.
On or before May 8, 1987, each party desiring to do so will submit to the Court in letter form a plan for the future discovery of information relating to such "donors” beyond that now ordered. Such plan should include details for contacting such “donors”, discovery directed to such "donors” and/or "testing" of such donors if contact, direct discovery and/or testing is anticipated.