The opinion
McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant preserved his error for review, I must dissent. It is apparently well-settled that:
“... a bill of exception must be complete within itself and must stand or fall by its own allegations, and it must plainly set out any error sought to be preserved for review. Garza v. State, 622 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). A bill of exception relating to the exclusion of evidence must set forth the evidence offered, the objections made thereto, the ruling of the court and such facts as may be necessary to disclose its relevancy, materiality and competency. See Clark v. State, 142 Tex.Crim.R. 554, 154 S.W.2d 255 (1941) and West v. State, 141 Tex.Crim.R. 233, *276 147 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Cr.App.1941). The appellate court will not indulge in inferences to supply the omission of essential statements in a bill of exception. Clark v. State, supra.” Aguirre v. State, 683 S.W.2d 502, 510 (Tex.App.—San Antonio, no petition.)
By engaging in speculation and “logic,” the majority concludes that the appellant’s objection at trial was that the trial court was wrongfully prohibiting him from calling character witnesses who were present to testify. Is it not just as logical (and just as speculative) that appellant was objecting to the trial court’s refusal to grant him a three day continuance so he could locate these alleged witnesses who he had failed diligently to locate or subpoena?
The “bill of exception” wholly fails to set forth what appellant’s objection was, and such a bill is deficient if it does not manifest the error complained of. Hoffman v. State, 397 S.W.2d 461 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); Brown v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 692 , 353 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.Cr.App.1962); Graves v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 595 , 336 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.Cr.App.1959). More importantly, Article 40.09(6)(d)(1) V.A.C.C.P., specifically requires that the bill of exception “establish the nature of such testimony or other evidence, and the objections and exceptions made in connection with the court’s exclusion of such testimony....”
Because the alleged error was not properly preserved, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm appellant’s conviction. I respectfully dissent.
ONION, P.J., and W.C. DAVIS and WHITE, JJ., join this dissent.