Opinion

Harris County Flood Control District v. Adam

  • 988 S.W.2d 423
  • 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 2142
  • 1999 WL 164113
Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Filed
Mar 18, 1999
Status
Published
Author
Taft
On the bench
Tim Taft
Cited by
10 cases
Authority
More cited than 10.7%

finding that, despite Mother Hubbard language, narrowly-defined severance order did not operate to create final and appeal-able judgment as to all parties and claims; rather, it merely created final and appeal-able judgment as to severed parties and claims

How later courts described this case

  • finding that, despite Mother Hubbard language, narrowly-defined severance order did not operate to create final and appeal-able judgment as to all parties and claims; rather, it merely created final and appeal-able judgment as to severed parties and claims
  • holding that Mother Hubbard clause in order severing claims against two of six defendants after trial court granted summary judgment in their favor created final judgment in severed cause but not in original cause
  • observing that ”[w]hat began as a benign growth allowing review of unripe claims on appeal, in Mafrige, became a malignant cancer cutting off causes of action before trial, in Inglish. If it were up to me, I would lock Mother Hubbard in the cupboard and return to the rule before Aldridge that a judgment is final and appealable only if it expressly disposes of all parties and all claims in the case. That appellants can even cite authority for the absurd result they seek illustrates how wrong a turn the law has taken in this area — and how strong the need to right it',"Harris County Flood Control District, 988 S.W.2d at 428
  • warning that, "[b]y the narrowest of margins, the latent danger in Kaigler has been narrowly averted in this case ... [Kaigler] does not follow Mafrige and Inglish as it purports to do, and, in fact, dramatically alters longstanding law. The near miss of unjustly terminating the causes of action of over 200 plaintiffs in this case should be ample warning, but apparently it is not."

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

TIM TAFT, Justice,

concurring ón denial of en banc rehearing.

What began as a benign growth allowing review of unripe claims on appeal, in Maf-rige, 1 became a malignant cancer cutting off causes of action before trial, in Inglish. 2 If it were up to me, I would lock Mother Hubbard in the cupboard and return to the rule before *428 Aldridge 3 that a judgment is final and ap-pealable only if it expressly disposes of all parties and all claims in the ease. That appellants can even cite authority for the absurd result they seek, illustrates how wrong a turn the law has taken in this area— and how strong the need to right it.

A unanimous Court voted to deny the motion for rehearing en banc.

. Kaigler, 961 S.W.2d at 277-78 (Justice Wilson dissenting).

. Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.1993).

. Inglish v. Union State Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1997).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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